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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION 
The Memorandum Decision appealed from was entered October 31, 
1989. A Determination of Finality certifying the decision as final 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) was entered on January 2, 1990. 
Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on January 2, 1990. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) 
(Supp. 1989). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the law of the case doctrine prohibit the trial 
court from modifying its Orders entered on December 5 and 6, 1988, 
where the Orders were entered after a hearing of which all parties 
had been given proper notice and an opportunity to be heard, all 
necessary relevant evidence had been presented to the court, and 
the court had been fully briefed concerning the relevant legal 
issues, and where no new evidence was presented to the court 
justifying the modification of the prior orders, but where the only 
claimed justification for modification of the prior orders was the 
court's reevaluation of the legal arguments which had been pre-
viously presented to the court? 
This is a question of law to be reviewed by this Court for 
correctness. See State v. Lamper, 779 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1989). 
2. Was the trial court's award of a total attorney fee of 
$4.25 million supported by the evidence where the only competent 
evidence established that the minimum reasonable award was 5.8 
million? 
Whether the award amount was reasonable is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. If there was no evidentiary support, the 
reduction is reviewed for correctness. See Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988); Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. 
Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215-16 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
3. Did the trial court err in awarding a fee based in part 
on the number of hours spent by class counsel ("lodestar analysis") 
rather than awarding a percentage of the amount recovered? 
This presents a question of law to be reviewed by this Court 
for correctness. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 
(Utah 1988). 
4. Is weight of the evidence contrary to the trial court's 
finding that class counsel's court performance does not merit 
exceptional recognition? 
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The standard of review is whether the finding is contrary to 
the great weight of the evidence. See Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. 
Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1989). 
5. Did the trial court err in basing its finding concern-
ing class counsel's court performance on events which occurred 
subsequent to the work for which attorney fees were awarded? 
The standard of review is abuse of discretion. See Bambrough 
v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). 
6. Must the decision be remanded where the trial court did 
not make findings on all material issues sufficient to determine 
whether the trial court abused its discretion? See Regional Sales 
Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215-16 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) . 
7. Does a trial court have discretion to appoint a special 
master to review cost disbursements in class action litigation, 
where there is no complex accounting to be performed and the only 
justification for the appointment is the trial court's lack of time 
to adequately review the matter? 
The issue of whether the trial court has discretion is a 
question of law, to be reviewed by this Court for correctness. See 
Swainston v. Intermountain Health Caref Inc., 766 P.2d 1059 (Utah 
1988) (trial court ruled on discretionary matter based on an 
erroneous legal premise; reviewed for correctness); Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988). 
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8. Is a trial court's appointment of a special master 
fatally defective where the court did not enter any findings of 
fact which would support the conclusion that there existed extra-
ordinary circumstances justifying the appointment of the special 
master? 
This is a question of law subject to review by this Court for 
correctness. 
9. If the appointment of a special master was within the 
discretion of the trial court, did the trial court abuse its 
discretion in appointing a special master under the circumstances 
of this case? 
The scope of review for this issue is whether the trial court 
abused its discretion. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 (9th 
Cir. 1982). 
10. Where the order appointing a special master instructed 
the special master to review cost disbursements and fee requests 
to service providers, did the special master exceed the scope of 
his appointment by undertaking to review the reasonableness of the 
attorney fees previously awarded by the court? 
This is a question of law subject to review by this Court for 
correctness. 
11. Where a special master has apparently exceeded the 
scope of his initial charge and parties in interest have filed 
objections to the proceedings of the special master and have 
requested oral argument on those objections and related motions, 
did the trial court abuse its discretion in summarily denying the 
4 
motions without receiving oral arguments and in sua sponte modify-
ing the order of appointment? 
The standard of review is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion. See Billincrs v. Brown. 639 P.2d 189, 190 (Utah 1981). 
12. Does the trial court have authority to appoint a 
special master to review the law and to make a recommendation to 
the court concerning legal issues relative to the award of attorney 
fees to class counsel in class action litigation? 
This is a question of law to be reviewed by this Court for 
correctness. See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, rehfg 
denied, 352 U.S. 1019 (1957). 
13. If the appointment of a special master to make recom-
mendations to the court on legal issues is within the court's 
discretion, did the trial court abuse its discretion in making such 
an appointment under the circumstances of this case? 
This issue is subject to review for abuse of discretion. 
14. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
class counsel's motion to strike the reports of the special master 
and to quash the appointment of the special master, where the 
uncontroverted evidenced showed that the master has exceeded the 
scope of his charge, had perceived his role as that of an advocate 
for the class, had undertaken to take evidence through ex parte 
contacts with various persons and without holding a hearing or 
making any record, and in otherwise failing to act as an unbiased 
judicial officer? 
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The issue of whether the master's actions were appropriate 
is a question of law to be reviewed by this Court for correctness. 
The issue of whether the trial court should have stricken the 
master's report and quashed the master's appointment should be 
reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion. See Focrel v. 
Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100 (2nd Cir. 1981). 
15. Is reversal of the judgment required by reason of the 
trial court's improper delegation of much of the judicial function 
to the special master, the trial court's frequent ex parte con-
ferences with the special master regarding judicial orders, and 
the trial court's apparent ex parte contacts with the special 
master regarding the special master's knowledge gained through the 
special master's own ex parte investigation? 
This issue presents a question of law to be reviewed by this 
Court for correctness. 
16. Were the recommendations of the special master sup-
ported by the evidence? 
This issue should be reviewed by this Court on a clearly 
erroneous standard. See Rohde v. K. 0. Steel Castings, Inc., 649 
F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1981). 
17. Did the trial court err in giving any weight to the 
report of the special master where that report did not contain any 
findings or recommendation concerning the factual issues before the 
court? 
The issue of whether the special master was required to make 
factual findings is a question of law subject to review by this 
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Court for correctness. The issue of whether the trial court erred 
in failing to strike the report should be reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. 
18. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to 
grant counsel's timely request for postponement of the hearing 
scheduled for July 17, 1989, where counsel for class counsel was 
unable to attend the majority of the hearing and was accordingly 
unable to effectively present his arguments at the hearing? 
This issue should be reviewed by this Court for an abuse of 
discretion. See Christensen v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1875 (Utah 1988). 
19. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in quashing 
the subpoenas issued at the request of class counsel for the 
purpose of presenting testimony at the July 17, 1989 hearing? 
This issue should be reviewed by this Court for an abuse of 
discretion. See Bullock v. Ungricht, 538 P.2d 190, 192 (Utah 
1975). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The provisions of Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure are set forth in the Appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from an award 
of attorney fees to the attorneys for the plaintiff class in class 
action tort litigation. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. The 
underlying class action was filed on July 20, 1987. Enabling 
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legislation to effect a settlement was enacted by the Utah State 
Legislature on October 4, 1988, and signed into law by Governor 
Norman Bangerter on October 11, 1988, effective upon the passage 
of sixty days. The legislation, together with subsequent amend-
ments, is codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-21-1 to -10 (Supp. 1989) . 
After notice to all parties in a form approved by the trial court, 
a hearing on the settlement and on class counsel's request for an 
award of attorney fees was held on November 30, 1988. Evidence 
regarding fees was accepted both by testimony and affidavit. 
On December 5, 1988, the trial court issued a Memorandum 
Decision, and on December 6, 1988, an Order, which, among other 
things, approved the settlement, awarded class counsel attorney 
fees of 5.8 million, and appointed a special master, James U. 
Jensen, "for the purpose of reviewing requests for cost reimburse-
ments . . .," retaining those cost reimbursement requests made by 
expert witnesses, lobbyists and other under advisement. The course 
of proceedings after the appointment of the master is set forth in 
more detail in the Agreed Statement in Lieu of Record on Appeal 
(included in the Appendix) and in the Argument. The special master 
ultimately submitted a final report and recommendation on July 14, 
1989. 
On July 17, 1989, the trial court held a hearing to consider 
the report of the special master and entertain arguments of coun-
sel. Following the hearing, the court entered a Memorandum 
Decision on October 31, 1989, which purported to alternatively 
withdraw all prior orders relating to attorney fees or to amend 
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them as having been interim orders, and made a reduced attorney fee 
award to class counsel of 4,25 million dollars. 
On November 21, 1989, class counsel filed a Motion to vacate 
the Memorandum Decision, and simultaneously and in conjunction with 
the plaintiff depositor class, filed a Motion to disqualify Judge 
David S. Young based on statements made in the Memorandum Decision 
and on prior statements. The motion was denied by Judge Scott 
Daniels at a hearing on December 27, 1989. A formal Order denying 
the motion was entered January 16, 1990. Appellants subsequently 
withdrew the Motion to Vacate as being moot. 
On December 1, 1989, appellants filed a Motion for a Deter-
mination of Finality pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) . The motion 
was granted by Order entered January 2, 1990. Appellants filed 
their Notice of Appeal the same day. 
C. Statement of Facts. The facts relevant to this action 
are set forth in the Agreed Statement in Lieu of Record on Appeal 
(herein "Agreed Statement") which appears in the Appendix. 
Additional facts are set forth in connection with the Argument. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The law of the case doctrine promotes confidence in the 
stability of judicial decisions, encourages judges to make a 
correct decision in the first instance and prohibits judges from 
sitting in review of their own decisions. The trial court in this 
case violated that doctrine. The court entered an award of attor-
ney fees following a hearing of which all parties had been given 
notice and at which all interested parties had an opportunity to 
9 
object and present evidence and arguments, and at which arguments 
both for and against the claimed award of attorney fees were made 
by competent counsel. The trial court committed error in there-
after reviewing and modifying its own decision. Such a modifica-
tion can appropriately be made only where there has been a change 
of circumstances or where other exceptional circumstances exist 
which justify reconsideration of the decision. The mere citation 
of additional case authority is not justification for reconsidera-
tion. Similarly improper as a grounds for reconsideration is the 
trial court taking the time to make a more thorough review of 
materials which were already available to the court prior to the 
first decision. No valid justification existed in this case for 
the trial court to reexamine its own decision, and the trial court 
committed error in so doing. 
Even if the trial court possessed the legal authority to 
reconsider its own decision, there was no evidentiary basis to 
modify the decision. All of the admissible evidence in the case 
established that the initial award of attorney fees was reasonable, 
or was less than reasonable. The plaintiff class, from whose 
recovery the attorney fee would be deducted, had agreed to the fee 
initially awarded. The trial court reduced the fee based predom-
inantly on "lodestar" analysis and on impressions and feelings 
concerning appellants which were developed subsequent to the time 
for which the attorney fees were to be awarded. Lodestar analysis 
should be rejected by this Court in common fund cases in favor of 
a percentage fee approach. A growing number of courts have 
10 
rejected lodestar and adopted a percentage fee approach after 
extensive investigation. The lodestar analysis promotes dissention 
between the attorneys and their clients, and involves a detailed 
accounting which is unnecessary and unproductive. The trial court 
further committed error in basing the reduction in attorney fees 
on events which transpired subsequent to the period for which fees 
were awarded. Such evidence of subsequent events is irrelevant and 
should not have been considered by the trial court. 
The trial court further committed error in referring issues 
concerning the reasonableness of attorney fees to a special master. 
There were no exceptional circumstances which justified the ap-
pointment of a master to review the attorney fees. More critical-
ly , both the master and the trial court apparently viewed the 
master's role to be that of an advocate cloaked with quasi-judicial 
authority. The master improperly took evidence on the issue of 
attorney fees off the record and without notice to the interested 
parties. The master communicated the improperly obtained evidence 
to the trial court through both formal reports and ex parte con-
tacts. The proceedings before the special master were violative 
of due process, and the trial court erred in failing to strike the 
reports and appointment of the master. 
Finally, the extent of the trial courtfs involvement in the 
improper proceedings of the master have put the trial court in the 
position of having received extensive evidence and arguments in a 
procedurally improper context. Any remand of this case should be 
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to a different judge who has not been tainted by the receipt of the 
improperly obtained evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS BARRED BY THE LAW OF 
THE CASE FROM RECONSIDERING ITS INITIAL 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES. 
The complicated and embroiled procedural history of this case 
demonstrates the evil of permitting a judge to recall and recon-
sider apparently final orders. The trial court's Memorandum 
Decision of December 5, 1988, and the Order of December 5, 1988, 
appeared on their face to make a conclusive and final award of 
attorney fees. The trial court imperiled the certainty of all 
judicial decisions by improperly purporting to recall and re-
consider its own decision. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that a decision, once 
made, should be considered final except in very unusual circum-
stances. In Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P. 2d 662 
(1966), the Court considered whether a party should be permitted 
to seek reconsideration, and "re-re-consideration," etc., of a 
ruling on a motion for new trial. The Court held that a motion for 
reconsideration was not permitted under the rules, and also ex-
plained that the restriction applied both to litigants and to the 
trial court: 
This reflection brings one to realize what 
an unsatisfactory situation would exist if 
a judge could carry in his mind indefin-
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itely a state of uncertainty as to what the 
final resolution of the matter should be. 
When the precedure [sic] 
authorizing a motion for a new trial has 
been followed and, pursuant to proper 
notice, the parties have made their repre-
sentations to the court, and the court has 
duly considered and made his decision upon 
that motion, that completes both the duty 
and the prerogative of the court. In order 
to avoid such a state of indecision for 
both the judge and the parties, practical 
expediency demands that there be some 
finality to the actions of the court; and 
he should not be in the position of having 
the further duty of acting as a court of 
review upon his own ruling. 
Drury, 415 P.2d at 663-64 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Although Drury dealt with a final ruling, the same logic 
applies to reconsideration of interim rulings. The "law of the 
case" doctrine provides that a decision will not be reconsidered 
at the same level except in very limited circumstances; any review 
should be by an appellate court: 
Although M[a]ny judge is free to 
change his or her mind on the outcome of 
a case until a decision is formally ren-
dered," Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P. 2d 757, 
760 (Utah 1985) , the "law of the case" 
doctrine is employed to avoid delay and to 
prevent injustice. "The purpose of [this] 
doctrine is that in the interest of economy 
of time and efficiency of procedure, it is 
desirable to avoid the delays and the 
difficulties involved in repetitious 
contentions and rulings upon the same 
propositions in the same case." Richardson 
v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 
(Utah 1977). See Condor v. A.L. Williams 
& Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) . "Although a trial court 
is not inexorably bound by its own prece-
dents, prior relevant rulings made in the 
same case are generally to be followed." 
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People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 
666 P.2d 550, 553 (Colo. 1983). 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 45 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The law of the case is sometimes expressed in terms of 
prohibiting a different judge of the same court from overruling a 
prior decision in the case. E.g., Sittner v. Bier Horn Tar Sands 
& Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984). The doctrine is 
equally applicable, however, to prohibit reconsideration of a 
ruling by the same judge or court which made the initial ruling. 
State ex rel. C.Y. v Yates, 765 P.2d 251, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(appellate court woaid not reconsider its own prior ruling); Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 
(Utah App. 1988) (trial court properly refused to reconsider his 
own prior ruling, even though the ruling was wrong on the merits 
and subsequently reversed by appellate court). 
The cases acknowledge that there are circumstances in which 
a court might properly reconsider its own ruling, but such cir-
cumstances do not exist in this case. The trial court apparently 
believed that justification existed for reexamining its ruling 
because it discovered additional cases on attorney fees and because 
it had taken the opportunity to review in more detail the materials 
which had been previously submitted. These factors do not con-
stitute grounds for reconsidering a decision. This was illustrated 
in the case of Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 
735 (Utah 1984) . The trial court in that case had denied the 
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plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and another judge of the 
same court later granted the motion. The Utah Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded for trial, without considering whether the 
summary judgment was proper and thus whether there were any fact 
issues to be tried. The Court stated as follows: 
No discovery took place between the 
two hearings on the summary judgment 
motions. No additional evidence was 
introduced. All material facts remained 
the same. Indeed, a comparison of the 
moving papers filed in support of the 
original motion and the renewed motion 
discloses that the only difference between 
the two was the citation of additional 
authorities. 
Sittner, 692 P.2d at 736. 
No procedural or other irregularities have been claimed with 
respect to the November 30, 1988, hearing concerning attorney fees. 
All parties were given notice in a form approved by the trial 
judge. (Agreed Statement para. 9.) All parties had an opportunity 
to present arguments. Arguments by capable counsel were presented 
both for and against appellants' claim for attorney fees. (Agreed 
Statement para. 13.) No restrictions were placed on the time which 
the trial court had to study the record before making a decision, 
nor on the scope of cases or other materials which the trial court 
could review. After having taken what the court then apparently 
considered to be a sufficient time to advise itself, the court 
entered a Memorandum Decision which, among other things, found the 
following: 
(1) That the attorneys have reason-
ably spent in excess of 12,000 hours, and 
will spend more time before the matter is 
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concluded. The novelty and difficulty of 
the issues involved has required tremendous 
skill in dealing with these problems before 
the legislature and before the court, 
(2) It is obvious that acceptance 
of this employment precluded other oppor-
tunities for employment. 
(3) The fees customarily charged for 
employment such as this involve contingent 
arrangements. This litigation could not 
reasonably have otherwise been entertained, 
and the amount of 20% to 40% of the 
recovery is appropriate in this and other 
similar communities. 
(4) Considering the amounts involved 
and the results obtained, it is difficult 
for the Court to find that counsel could 
have expected a much more optimistic 
result, though tha depositors individually 
did. It is easily arguable that the 
maximum amount of liability under any 
scenario that the State should have 
incurred would have been an amount equal 
to the guarnteed [sic] amount of $15,000.00 
per account which was the ILGC guarantee 
on such accounts. Thus, anyone whose 
account exceeded $15,000.00 could arguably 
have never expected a greater recovery. 
(5) The time limitations imposed by 
the clients appear to be fundamentally 
irrelevant, except as they may apply to 
item (2) above. 
(6) The nature and length of the 
relationship does not raise issues that are 
remarkable, except to state that perhaps 
the fact that the matter has been resolved 
in less than two years and without the 
necessity of trial would argue for a 
reduction in fees. 
(7) The experience, reputation and 
ability of the lawyers is obvious and has 
been exemplary. 
(8) The contingent relationship has 
already been referred to. 
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Having considered each of the fore-
going, the Court finds that a fee at the 
minimum of the contingent agreement rela-
tionship in the amount of 20% of the total 
recovery is reasonable. The attorney's 
fees are thus awarded in the amount of 
$5,800,000.00. However, the Court finds 
that many matters related to this case have 
not been concluded by counsel and thus the 
Court will reserve 10% of the fee until 
counsel have faithfully completed all 
matters in the case. 
Memorandum Decision, filed December 5, 1988, at pp. 6-7. (A 
complete copy of the Memorandum Decision appears in the Appendix.) 
Based on the foregoing findings, the trial court entered an 
Order awarding the attorney fees to appellants, and further 
ordering that 90% of the fees "are to be paid immediately." 
(Order, filed December 6, 1988, p. 3, para. 3. A copy of the Order 
appears in the Appendix.) Nothing in the Order indicated that it 
was other than a final determination of the attorney fee issue. 
Based upon the well-established doctrine of the law of the 
case, the trial court erred in reconsidering its December 5, 1988 
Memorandum Decision and December 6, 1988 Order. This case should 
be remanded to the trial court with directions to reinstate the 
December 6, 1988 Order. 
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POINT II 
REDUCTION OF ATTORNEY FEES WAS BASED IN 
PART ON THE LODESTAR ANALYSIS, WHICH IS 
NOT APPROPRIATE FOR COMMON FUND CASES, AND 
WAS CONTRARY TO THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
A. The Lack Of Detailed Findings Of Fact Precludes 
Meaningful Appellate Review And Requires Reversal, 
The amount of fees awarded to attorneys for successful 
plaintiffs in class action litigation is determined by the court. 
"Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion 
of the trial court, and will not be overturned in the absence of 
a showing of a clear abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). The 
award of attorney fees must, however, be supported by evidence in 
the record. Id. Where a party has made a prima facia showing of 
an entitlement to a specified amount of fees, it is error for the 
court to reduce the fees without making an adequate explanation 
for the reduction. Id.; Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 517-18 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). The court's analysis and evidentiary 
foundation for reducing the fees must be set forth in findings of 
fact with enough detail to enable the reviewing court to determine 
whether the trial court abused its discretion. Regional Sales 
Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215-16 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) . 
The trial court in this case was required to make specific 
findings to justify the reduction of the claimed fee. The court's 
initial award was supported by the evidence. The court itself so 
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held in its Memorandum Decision of December 5, 1988. In addition, 
appellants proffered to the trial court evidence from several 
expert witnesses (attorneys skilled in class action and percentage 
fee litigation) each of whom established that the initial fee award 
was reasonable or less than reasonable. No contrary evidence was 
submitted in support of the reduction. The agreement between 
appellants and the plaintiff class provided that a reasonable fee 
would be in the range of 20-40% of the recovery. The fee initially 
awarded by the court was 20% of the $29 million portion of the 
recovery. 
The trial court was accordingly required to explain its 
reasons for reducing the fee. It is impossible to determine from 
the Memorandum Decision, however, precisely why the fee was 
reduced. The Memorandum Decision does recite the various factors 
which may be considered by the court in fixing a fee, but does not 
detail how the court analyzed each factor. To the extent that the 
court does explain its analysis, the analysis does not support the 
fee ultimately awarded. 
Appellants argue in Point I of this brief that the law of the 
case requires that the trial court reinstate its initial award of 
attorney fees. If this Court does not so hold, the case must 
nonetheless be remanded to the trial court for the entry of 
specific findings to enable this Court to review whether the trial 
court abused its discretion. 
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B. This Court Should Adopt A Percentage-Of-Fund Approach 
To Setting Attorney Fees In Common Fund Litigation. 
Much of the dispute before the trial court and the special 
master centered around the attempt to apply "lodestar" or hour-
based analysis to this case. Although award of attorney fees is 
usually reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988), no deference need be given 
where the trial court's discretion was exercised based on an 
erroneous legal standard. See Swainston v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 766 P. 2d 1059 (Utah 1988) (trial court ruled on 
discretionary matter based on an erroneous legal premise; reviewed 
for correctness); see also Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 116-
17 (2nd Cir. 1981). 
The appellants and the trial court assumed, without citation 
to any supporting authority, that the trial court had ultimate 
discretion to set the fee. The Special Master cited as support for 
this proposition the case of Damac, Inc. v. Whitler, 118 111. App. 
3d 560, 455 N.E. 2d 254 (1983), where the court stated: 
In a class action, the fee is not the 
result of a voluntary agreement between the 
attorney and his client. Rather, the fee 
is an amount taken by order of the court 
from money that belongs to others, and the 
amount is dependent upon the exercise of 
the court's sound discretion. 
455 N.E.2d at 256 (citations omitted). 
In the instant case, however, the fee agreement was the 
result of a voluntary agreement between the attorneys and their 
clients. Over 80% of the class expressly approved the fee agree-
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ment. Over 99.9% of the class approved the settlement, together 
with appellants' request for a fee of $7.25 million. Although the 
fee agreement did state that the fees would be set by the trial 
court, the fee agreement also clearly stated that a reasonable fee 
would be awarded, and that a reasonable fee would be (1) based on 
a percentage of the recovery and (2) in the range of 20% to 40% of 
the recovery. Under the unique circumstances of this case, 
therefore, the trial court was required to give great deference to 
the "contractual" agreement between the class and their counsel, 
and to set the fee as a percentage of the recovery, with 20% - 40% 
being the agreed range of a reasonable fee. 
It appears from the record that the trial court instead 
choose to largely ignore the agreement, and computed a fee based 
on an analysis of the hours spent by appellants. The trial court's 
reduction in fees was largely influenced by lodestar analysis. 
"Lodestar" is a term which was coined by the court in Lindy 
Brothers, Inc. of Philadelphia v. American Radiator and Standard 
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1973). The lodestar 
approach essentially has the court determine the number of hours 
reasonably spent in obtaining the results, and then adjust the 
compensation for those hours either up or down by a multiplier the 
court determines appropriate. Factors considered in the adjust-
ments include the quality of the work performed and the contingent 
nature of the case, etc. Other modifications of the lodestar 
approach have been developed; for example, the Fifth Circuit 
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adopted a fifteen-factor method to calculate fees. Johnson v. 
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). 
Such hour-based formulas have come under increasing attack, 
and the better reasoned opinions now recognize that the preferred 
approach in common fund cases is to award a fee based on a per-
centage of the recovery. The United States Supreme Court recog-
nized this method as being common in Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 
900 n. 16 (1984) . The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, which was the court to initially adopt the lodestar 
approach, has now rejected that approach in favor of a percentage 
fee approach. Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, Court 
Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237 (1985). 
A recent court to adopt the common fund approach analyzed the 
logic of prior cases as follows: 
Courts have pursued a number of 
alternatives at the fee application stage. 
Some, by themselves or with the assistance 
of a magistrate, have waded through the 
computer printouts, which often represent 
years of work by several firms, their 
partners, associates, and paralegals. 
Others have appointed special masters 
familiar with the field and with attorney 
billing to perform the details of the task 
and to make a recommendation. The special 
master is then paid from the common fund. 
This court has used both of these alterna-
tives. Undoubtedly, there are more crea-
tive ones that other courts have found. 
What is curious is that whatever method is 
used and no matter what billing records are 
submitted to the Lindy or Kerr-Johnson 
[Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 
F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975), cert, denied sub 
nom.. Perkins v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc. , 
425 U.S. 951 (1976) ; and Johnson v. Georgia 
Highway Express, Inc., supra] regimen, the 
result is an award that almost always 
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hovers around 30% of the fund created by 
the settlement. 
The question this court is compelled 
to ask is, "Is this process necessary?" 
Under a cost-benefit analysis, the answer 
would be a resounding, "No!" Not only do 
the Lindy and Kerr-Johnson analysis consume 
an undue amount of court time with little 
resulting advantage to anyone, but, in 
fact, it may be to the detriment of the 
class members. They are forced to wait 
until the court has done a thorough, 
conscientious analysis of the attorneys' 
fee petition. Or, class members may suffer 
a further diminution of their fund when a 
special master is retained and paid from 
the fund. Most important, however, is the 
effect the process has on the litigation 
and the timing of settlement. Where 
attorneys must depend on a lodestar 
approach there is little incentive to 
arrive at an early settlement. The history 
of these cases demonstrates this as noted 
below in the discussion of typical per-
centage awards. 
In re Activision Securities Litigation, 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1376 
(N.D. Calif. 1989) . 
The court analyzed cases from numerous other jurisdictions 
and concluded as follows: 
Reviewing this history the court is 
compelled to conclude that the accepted 
practice of applying the lodestar or Kerr-
Johnson regimen to common fund cases does 
not achieve the stated purposes of propor-
tionality, predictability and protection 
of the class, it encourages abuses such as 
unjustified work and protracting the 
litigation. It adds to the work load of 
already overworked district courts. In 
short, it does not encourage efficiency, 
but rather, it adds inefficiency to the 
process. 
Therefore, this court concludes that 
in class action common fund cases the 
better practice is to set a percentage fee 
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and that, absent extraordinary circum-
stances that suggest reasons to lower or 
increase the percentage, the rate should 
be set at 3 0%. This will encourage plain-
tiff's attorneys to move for early settle-
ment, provide predictability for the 
attorneys and the class members, and reduce 
the time consumed by counsel and court in 
dealing with voluminous fee petitions. 
Id. at 1378-79. See also McConaughy, Back to the Future: Use of 
Percentage Fee Arrangements in Common Fund Litigation, 12 U. Puget 
Sound L. Rev. 43 (1988) (recommends the use of a percentage fee 
agreement in common fund cases, and notes that a fee of 20 to 25% 
is typical.) 
It is evident from a review of the record in this case that 
both the special master and the trial court were overly concerned 
with trying to relate the number of hours spent by appellants to 
the fee awarded, and with the claimed disparity between the value 
of those hours at an hourly billing rate and the amount of the 
claimed fee. The disparity does not, however, mean that the 
claimed compensation is unreasonable. As set forth in the cases 
cited above, appellants could no doubt have protracted the litiga-
tion with the result that their hours would have been higher. 
Appellants should not be penalized for their efficiency: 
Where success is a condition precedent to 
compensation, "hours of time expended" is 
a nebulous, highly variable standard, of 
limited significance. One thousand plod-
ding hours may be far less productive than 
one imaginative, brilliant hour. A surgeon 
who skillfully performs an appendectomy in 
seven minutes is entitled to no smaller fee 
than one who takes an hour; many of 
patients would think he is entitled to 
more. 
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Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: "The Salvage Factor" in Counsel Fee 
Awards. 60 Harvard L. Rev. 658, 660 (1956). 
This Court should hold that the number of hours spent should 
be given little, if any, weight in determining the appropriate 
attorney fee in common fund litigation, and that the attorney fee 
should generally be determined as a percentage of the recovery. 
It was error in this case for the trial court to give any weight 
to the number of hours spent, and the reduction of attorney fees 
must be vacated. 
C. There Is No Evidentiary Basis For The Trial Court's 
Conclusion That Appellants' Hours Were Padded Or Unreasonable. 
The preceding analysis establishes that the number of hours 
spent by counsel should not be a factor in determining an attorney 
fee award. Even if this Court affirms the trial court's reliance 
on lodestar analysis, the multiplier chosen by the trial court is 
not supported by the evidence. 
Awards of attorney fees are addressed to the sound discretion 
of the trial court. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 
(Utah 1988). Where the underlying evidence is proffered, however, 
this Court is in as good a position as the trial court to evaluate 
the evidence. Bess v. Jensen, 782 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (citing Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc. v. Great N. Baseball 
Co., 748 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1987)). Under such circumstances, 
the trial court's decision should be affirmed only if this Court 
is convinced of its correctness. Id. See also Rohde v. K. 0. 
Steel Castings. Inc., 649 F.2d 317, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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On page 10 of its Memorandum Decision, the trial court 
"suggests that class counsel's reported hours submitted to the 
court were higher than reasonable hours, and the court has noted 
certain discrepancies in such reported hours." The special 
master's final report made similar claims. (Final Report, p. 20.) 
Nowhere, however, does either the court or the special master 
detail exactly what discrepancies exist, nor give any factual basis 
for the claim that the hours were higher than reasonable hours. 
The court's unsupported statements should be stricken and the 
reduction in fee vacated. 
D. The Trial Court Improperly Based the Fee Reduction on 
Events Which Occurred After the Fee Was Earned. 
In connection with its original fee award, the trial court 
found that "[t]he experience, reputation and ability of the lawyers 
is obvious and has been exemplary." (Memorandum Decision, filed 
December 5, 1988, at p. 7.) As supposed support for the reduction, 
the trial court found on October 31, 1989, that "on the issue of 
evaluation of skills and competence of counsel, the Court finds 
based in part on the hearing of July 17, 1989, and a review of the 
record, that counsel's court performance does not merit exceptional 
recognition." (Memorandum Decision, filed October 31, 1989, p. 
10.) 
Even assuming that something occurred in the July 17, 1989, 
hearing which would justify the trial court in criticizing the 
court performance of appellants, that hearing occurred long after 
the period of time for which fees were sought. Subsequent events 
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are generally not admissible proof concerning what happened on a 
prior event. See Utah R. Evid. 407. 
There was no evidence which could support the trial court 
changing its finding. The original finding was based solely on the 
trial courtfs observation of appellants in various court proceed-
ings prior to December 5, 1988. No additional evidence on that 
issue was presented. It was error for the trial court to re-
consider the finding. 
Of more concern is that fact that the trial court apparently 
changed its finding because of a personal dislike for one of the 
appellants and a personal offense at arguments presented at the 
July 17, 1989, hearing. Although the trial court states in its 
Memorandum Decision that it had reviewed "the oral arguments of 
counsel" from the July 17 hearing (Memorandum Decision, Oct 31, 
1989, p. 1), the trial court really only reviewed the arguments of 
Malcolm A. Misuraca. Arguments were also presented by Craig G. 
Adamson, attorney for the depositors, and by Jackson Howard, 
attorney for appellants. The arguments of Mr. Misuraca were really 
only intended to fill time while the parties waited for Mr. Howard 
to appear at the arguments. The primary arguments for appellants 
were offered by Mr. Howard. 
Yet the trial court ordered a transcript of only Mr. 
Misuracafs arguments at the hearing. The arguments presented by 
Mr. Misuraca were critical of the trial court, and the trial court 
apparently took umbrage. A review of the October 31, 1989, 
Memorandum Decision compels the conclusion that it is primarily a 
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personal response to the arguments of Mr. Misuraca. It was wholly 
improper for the trial court to have stooped to penalizing the 
appellants by a personal attack on Mr. Misuraca. 
POINT III 
THE IMPROPER PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE MASTER 
REQUIRE REVERSAL. 
Rule 43(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly 
states that "[i]n all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall be 
taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by these 
rules, the Utah Rules of Evidence, or a statute of this state." 
(Emphasis added.) Our judicial system contemplates that all 
evidence considered by the judge will be developed in the court-
room. In limited circumstances, a judge is permitted to view the 
premises in question in a lawsuit, but only when notice is given 
to all parties. E.g.. Hiahbaraer v. Thornock. 94 Idaho 829, 498 
P.2d 1302, 1304 (1972). It is reversible error for a judge to 
violate this fundamental notion of due process by investigating the 
facts himself. Id. 
Equally "fundamentally contrary to the nature of our adver-
sary system" would be a judge acting as an advocate for one of the 
parties. Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah 1982). 
A trial court clearly cannot employ another judicial officer 
to improperly take evidence which the judge could not do himself. 
Yet such a fundamental violation of due process occurred in this 
case. The trial court appointed a special master for the stated 
purpose of reviewing requests for cost reimbursement. The initial 
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appointment appeared of record and was limited in scope. There 
thereafter commenced, however, a series of discussions between the 
master and court, all off the record, in which the master appar-
ently persuaded the court to increase the master's authority and 
pursuant to which the master undertook to provide an advocacy role 
in the litigation. Although the trial court in its Memorandum 
Decision purported to conduct "its own review and evaluation," and 
to make "its own memorandum decision," (Memorandum Decision at 7-
8), the proceedings had become so tainted by the contact with the 
master that appellants were denied a right to a fair trial before 
an unbiased judge. The error was prejudicial and requires rever-
sal. The primary areas of error relating to the master are briefed 
below. 
A. The Activities Of The Special Master Exceeded Both The 
Scope Of His Appointment And The Permissible Duties Of A Special 
Master. 
Special Master James U. Jensen1 was initially appointed 
solely for the limited purpose of reviewing the claims for cost 
reimbursement submitted to the trial court. Appellants did not 
object to the initial appointment. When it became evident, 
however, that the special master was vastly exceeding the scope of 
his employment, appellants did object (Motion to Strike Reports of 
Another special master, Arthur Anderson, was appointed to 
review certain accounting matters and to make disbursements of funds 
to class members. The appointment and scope of the activities of 
Special Master Arthur Anderson are not at issue in this appeal. The 
term "special master" as used herein, unless otherwise indicated, 
shall refer only to James U. Jensen. 
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Special Master and for Other Relief, filed June 15, 1989), but the 
trial court overruled the objections and attempted to expand the 
scope of the master's inquiry beyond all permissible bounds. The 
matter should be reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion. 
The abuse of discretion is patent. 
Rule 53(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in 
part, as follows: 
The order of reference to the master may 
specify or limit his powers and may direct 
him to report only upon particular issues 
or to do or perform particular acts or to 
receive and report evidence only and may 
fix the time and place for beginning and 
closing of the hearings and for the filing 
of the master's report. Subiect to the 
specifications and limitations stated in 
the order, the master has and shall exer-
cise the power to regulate all proceedings 
in every hearing before him and to do all 
acts and take all measures necessary or 
proper for the efficient performance of his 
duties under the order. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Because the use of special masters is a rare occurrence, the 
Utah courts have developed almost no case law interpreting Rule 53. 
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is essen-
tially the same as the Utah Rule, has generated more, though not 
extensive, case law. Where the Utah case law is not fully devel-
oped, and because the Utah Rules are patterned after the Federal 
Rules, federal law may be used as a guide. Heritage Bank & Trust 
v. Landon, 770 P.2d 1009, 1010 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Accord 
Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 n.l (Utah 1984). 
Subsection (c) of Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
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is identical to the same provision of the Utah rule in every 
respect except that the words "the master11 are used in the federal 
rule where the Utah rule uses the word "he." 
The plain language of Subsection (c) dictates that when a 
special master is appointed to perform only certain tasks deline-
ated in the order of reference, then the powers of the master are 
limited in scope to those specifically enumerated items. In 
explaining the federal rule, Moore's Federal Practice states as 
follows: 
The scope of the master's authority "may" 
be specified or limited by the order of 
reference. If so, the order of reference 
is "at once the chart and limitation of the 
master' s authority. " And the master should 
not exceed it even with the consent of the 
parties. The order of reference may direct 
the master to report only upon particular 
issues or to do or perform particular acts 
or to receive and report evidence only. 
But as indicated by the use of the word 
"may" in the first sentence and by the 
general grant of power given by the second 
sentence of subdivision (c), a reference 
containing no limitations is a general 
reference to report on all the issues, both 
of law and fact, involved in the litiga-
tion. 
5A J. Moore, W. Taggert and J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice. 
para. 53.06 (2d ed. 1989) (quoting Ferguson Contracting Co. v. 
Manhattan Trust Co. . 118 F. 791, 794 (6th Cir. 1902)) (emphasis 
added). (Hereinafter "Moore's".) 
Moore's goes on to state as follows: 
The order of reference is the chart of the 
master's authority, which may give the 
master broad, general powers, or may 
specify or limit his powers, direct him to 
report only upon particular issues, do or 
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perform particular acts, or to receive and 
report evidence only. The report of the 
master should accordingly be responsive to 
the order of reference. 
5A Moore's, at para. 53.10[1] (citations omitted). A special 
master may not exceed the scope of his charge because fl[t]he power 
of a special master is completely dependent upon the order of 
reference." United States v. I.B.M. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 
1974). Accord Messier v. Messier, 140 Vt. 308, 438 A.2d 397 (1981) 
(interpreting rule of civil procedure identical to Utah's). 
The trial court first mentions the appointment of James U. 
Jensen as Special Master in its Memorandum Decision dated December 
5, 1988. On pages 8 to 9 of that decision, this Court specifically 
held as follows: 
3. The unpaid costs and fees proportion 
shall be reserved, subject to a similar 
accounting to the Court directly. Since 
these matters will require voluminous 
supportive documentation, the Court hereby 
and herein appoints James U. Jensen, Esq. , 
under Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure as a Special Master for the 
purpose of reviewing the specific documen-
tation giving rise to the requested reim-
bursement costs. Mr. Jensen is to make 
specific recommendations to the Court as 
to his findings. No fees will be approved 
for reimbursement of costs or unpaid costs 
and expenses until specifically recommended 
by the master and approved by the Court. 
Mr. Jensen is charged with a duty both to 
be fair to those requesting payment and to 
function as a fiduciary for the purpose of 
preserving the maximum estate to the 
depositor group from the funds so withheld. 
Mr. Jensen and/or persons in his firm are 
hereby expressly authorized to have access 
to any and all documentation supporting 
such costs and fees, including the lob-
byist's fee requests, and shall be provided 
such material upon request at the offices 
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of D.0.I.T., Arthur Andersen, Research 
Associates and/or any other firm, entity 
or individual requesting compensation as 
they deem necessary. Compensation to Mr. 
Jensen shall be carefully reviewed by the 
Court and shall be paid from the funds 
reserved. 
Memorandum Decision, pages 8-9 (emphasis added).2 
The order of reference, which according to Rule 53 is the 
controlling document, provides as follows: 
4. That James U. Jensen, Esq. be 
appointed, pursuant to Rule 53 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, as a special 
master for the purpose of reviewing 
requests for costs reimbursements, and that 
services rendered as special master be 
compensated from the funds hereinafter 
reserved, as approved by the court; 
Order of December 6, 1988, page 3 (emphasis added). 
The trial court's direction and charge to the Special Master 
was clear. James U. Jensen was appointed for the purpose of 
reviewing costs reimbursements only. The Special Master, however, 
took it upon himself to go beyond the scope of his charge and 
The language of the Memorandum Decision in several places 
mentions "fees." It is readily apparent, however, that the fees 
referred to are those of the experts and not attorney's fees. 
Immediately preceding the above quoted paragraph, the Memorandum 
Decision states that "[t]he reimbursement for depositors in the 
amount of $300,000.00 shall be reserved, subject to release on 
specific application to the Court based upon specific documentation 
of costs and fees and shall only be released upon Court approval." 
(Emphasis added.) Paragraph 3 then begins by speaking to the same 
unpaid costs and fees, which clearly refers to the $300,000.00 in 
costs previously advanced by the DOIT Committee, for which reimburse-
ment was sought. Likewise, the other references in paragraph 3 to 
"fees" refer to expert fees, including the specifically referenced 
"lobbyist's fee requests", and not to attorney's fees. There should 
have been no confusion on the part of the Special Master as to the 
meaning of these terms. 
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review the issue of attorney fees notwithstanding the fact that 
that issue had already been determined by the trial court. 
When appellants objected to the appointment of the master, 
the trial court responded by sua sponte entering a series of minute 
entries which purported to "clarify" the masterfs responsibilities. 
The minute entries, copies of which appear in the Appendix, 
essentially set the master up as an advocate for the class with a 
duty to challenge the prior orders of the court. Aside from the 
procedural irregularities in attempting to expand the scope of the 
charge after the fact, the court had no authority to vest a special 
master with the roles of both advocate and judge.3 
Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as 
follows: 
(a) Appointment and Compensation. Any 
or all of the issues in an action may be 
referred by the Court to a master upon the 
written consent of the parties, or the 
court may appoint a master in an action, 
in accordance with the provisions of 
Subdivision (b) of this rule. 
* * * 
(b) Reference. A reference to a master 
shall be the exception and not the rule. 
In actions to be tried by a jury, a refer-
ence shall be made only when the issues are 
complicated; in actions to be tried without 
a jury, save in matters of account, a 
3Even more disturbing is the fact, revealed for the first time 
in billing records filed with the court subsequent to the filing of 
the Notice of Appeal herein, that the special master conferred 
extensively with the Court in response to the challenges to the 
special master's appointment, and presumably participated in ruling 
on the objections to his own appointment. (E.g., Affidavit of Robert 
L. Stolebarger in Support of Motion for Disqualification, filed Nov. 
21, 1989, at paras. 25-26.) 
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reference shall, in the absence of the 
written consent of the parties, be made 
only upon a showing that some exceptional 
condition requires it. 
(Emphasis added.) This requirement that the appointment of a 
special master must be "the exception and not the rule" is derived 
from important policy considerations: first, "the function of the 
master [is] to hear only those matters which it would unduly hamper 
the court (or the jury) to deal with;" second, Rule 43(a) requires 
"all testimony of witnesses to be taken orally in open court," 
unless otherwise provided by the rules; and third, the exceptional 
conditions requirement of Rule 53 "is an obvious corollary of the 
policy against the judiciary abrogating its functions." 5A Moore's 
at para. 53.05[1]. 
The United States Supreme Court established the standard for 
determining "exceptional conditions" in the case of La Buy v. Howes 
Leather Co. , 352 U.S. 249, reh'cr. denied, 352 U.S. 1019 (1957). 
The Court held that "[t]he use of masters is 'to aid judges in the 
performance of specific judicial duties, as they may arise in the 
progress of a cause,' and not to displace the Court." Id. at 256 
(quoting In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920)). In light of 
this fact, the Court went on to establish a standard of very 
limited use of special masters. Neither congested court calendars, 
unusual complexity of issues of fact and law, nor the possibility 
of a very lengthy trial are exceptional conditions. Id. at 259. 
The Court held that detailed accounting required to determine 
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damages might be referred to a master provided the circumstances 
indicate that the use of the Court's time is not warranted. Id. 
Calendar congestion, complex issues, and the possibility of 
lengthy trials had, previous to La Buy, been cited frequently as 
exceptional conditions. The Supreme Courtfs elimination of these 
concepts for exceptional conditions "has led La Buy to be widely 
interpreted as sharply limiting the use of non-consensual refer-
ence." Liptak v. United States, 748 F.2d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 
1984) (citing Bennerson v. Joseph, 583 F.2d 633, 641-42 (3rd Cir. 
1978); Piper v. Hauck, 532 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1976); and Arthur 
Murray, Inc. v. Oliver, 364 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1966)). In Liptak, 
certain tax payers had brought an action against the government for 
wrongful levy, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the 
government from selling their home in order to collect delinquent 
taxes. The District Court entered a temporary restraining order 
preventing the sale of the home and referred the case to a special 
master for a recommendation on the question of whether to grant a 
preliminary injunction against the sale. The master held a hearing 
and prepared a report of his recommendations. The District Court 
adopted the master's report and the Liptaks appealed. 
On appeal, the Liptaks argued that the reference to the 
special master was improper since there were no exceptional 
conditions to warrant the appointment. They further alleged that 
the master's report went beyond the scope of his charge in that the 
master was charged to consider the issue of a preliminary injunc-
tion, but the master, going beyond the issue of injunction, 
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recommended a dismissal of the Liptaks1 Complaint. The Eighth 
Circuit Court reviewed the exceptional conditions requirement as 
set forth by the Supreme Court in La Buy, and found that ,f[b]eyond 
matters of account, difficult computation of damages, and unusual 
discovery, 'it is difficult to conceive of a reference of a nonjury 
case that will meet the rigid standards of the La Buy decision."1 
Liptak v. United States, 748 F.2d at 1257 (quoting 9 C. Wright and 
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2605, at 791 (1971)). 
The Court then held that the District Court had abused its discre-
tion in appointing a special master. 
In the present case, consent of the parties was not solicited 
or given for the appointment of a special master. Some exceptional 
condition was therefore required. The special master was appointed 
to review cost reimbursement requests. Additionally, the master 
took it upon himself to review the issue of attorney fees. The 
issue of cost reimbursements cannot be said to be a matter of 
account, because the accounting was complete and the master was 
simply charged with the responsibility of reviewing the accounting, 
and presumably making recommendations as to the appropriateness of 
the cost reimbursement requests. This purpose does not fit within 
the narrow La Buy definition of exceptional conditions. 
Just as matters of account are apt 
to be most appropriate for reference, 
conversely there are some matters that may 
generally be inappropriate for reference. 
Or stated differently, it will be rare when 
some particular issues call for a reference 
in light of the "exceptional condition" 
requirement of Rule 53 (b) . Thus some 
appellate courts have expressed their 
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disapproval of referring issues of costs 
• » • • 
5A Moore's at para. 53.05[2] (citing Prudence-Bonds Corp. v. 
Prudence Realization Corp.. 174 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1949)). Please 
note that the Prudence-Bonds Corp. case, cited in Moore's for the 
proposition that issues of costs are not appropriate for reference 
to a special master, was decided before the La Buy decision which 
restricted the use of special masters. If reference of issues of 
costs to a special master was inappropriate prior to La Buy, it 
certainly would not be appropriate after La Buy. It is even more 
clear that the trial court did not have authority to refer to the 
special master the question of attorney fees. 
The conduct of the special master greatly exceeded both the 
actual and the permissible scope of his charge. The trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to quash the appointment and to 
strike all of the reports of the master. 
B. The Master Improperly Acted As An Advocate. 
The role of a special master is quasi-judicial in nature. 
A master has the "duties and obligations of a judicial officer," 
and is "an arm of the court." 5A Moore's, at para's. 53.03 & 
53.05[2]. Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly 
contemplates a judicial role. The Rule gives to masters the 
authority to hold hearings, take evidence, hear testimony, and rule 
on the admissibility of evidence. These functions properly belong 
to the judiciary. Since a master functions in a judicial capacity, 
he necessarily has the obligation to fairly and impartially 
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consider the evidence and make recommendations based thereon. A 
special master has quasi-judicial powers, and "because he is the 
court's agent, he can and should perform his duties objectively." 
Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1162-63 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 
460 U.S. 1042 (1982). The job of advocating one position or 
another is left to the lawyers. 
The Master in the present case confused his proper role with 
that of an advocate and adopted an adversarial posture. The trial 
court also apparently perceived the master's role as adversarial. 
The only justification given by the trial court for reevaluating 
the initial award of attorney fees was that the initial hearing was 
not "adversarial." (Memorandum Decision, October 31, 1989, p. 3.) 
The only "adversarial" element to the subsequent reduction, 
however, was the Special Master. 
Both the special master and the trial court complained that 
"no worthy opposition" was raised to appellants' fee application 
at the hearing on November 30, 1988. Both the trial court and 
special master apparently perceived the special master's role as 
providing that opposition. That is contrary to fundamental notions 
of due process, Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah 1982). 
The initial premise was, in any event, incorrect. If "no worthy 
opposition" was raised to the fee application, it was not because 
of a lack of an adversarial proceeding. Competent counsel appeared 
at the November 30, 1988 hearing, and spoke against the appellant's 
claim for attorney fees. The hearing was adversarial. There was 
clearly no basis to appoint a special master. The trial court 
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abused its discretion in so doing. The effect of the appointment 
was clearly prejudicial, and the judgment of the trial court must 
be reversed. 
C. The Proceedings Before The Special Master Violated 
Notions Of Due Process Because The Master Failed To Hold Hearings 
And Take Evidence On The Record. 
In addition to having exceeded the scope of his charge, in 
violation of Rule 53(c), the Master failed to hold hearings, take 
evidence, hear witnesses, etc., as contemplated by Rule 53. A 
special master is called upon to perform a quasi-judicial function. 
He is to recommend factual findings and, in some instances, legal 
conclusions. In order to do so, a master must follow proper 
evidentiary procedures and comply with the requirements of due 
process; therefore, for a master to take evidence on which to base 
his findings and recommendations, hearings are required. Rule 53 
presumes that hearings will be a part of the normal course of 
conduct of a special master. 
(c) Powers. The order of reference 
to the master . . . may fix the time and 
place for beginning and closing the hear-
ings and for the filing of the master's 
report. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 53(c) (emphasis added). Notice that the Rule 
refers to "the hearings," not "any hearings," and therefore expects 
that hearings will be held. Indeed, a master cannot perform a fact 
finding function within the bounds of due process without open 
hearings. 
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Based on this principle, the Fifth Circuit modified a 
district court's order of reference because the order allowed the 
special master to go beyond the bounds of Rule 53 and due process 
requirements: 
In one respect, the order of refer-
ence is too sweeping. It permits the 
special master to submit to the district 
court "reports based upon his own observa-
tions and investigations in the absence of 
a formal hearing before him." This not 
only transcends the powers traditionally 
given masters by courts of equity, but 
denies the parties due process. 
Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1162-63 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 
460 U.S. 1042 (1982) . The court went on to hold that the order of 
reference should be modified to reflect that "unless based on 
hearings conducted on the record after proper notice, the reports, 
findings, and conclusions of the special master are not to be 
accorded any presumption of correctness . . . ." Id. at 1163. 
In response to objections from appellants, the master did 
condescend to hold one "hearing." Appellants had indicated that 
they would require at least two days to present evidence. (Agreed 
Statement para. 27.) The master instead, with the apparent 
blessing of the court, limited the presentation to approximately 
two hours on a Saturday morning. Appellants were required to 
present their evidence by way of proffer, rather than through live 
witnesses. Appellants attempted to comply with the master's 
direction, and submitted testimony from several expert witnesses 
based on a hypothetical question. 
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In his report to the court, however, the master attempted to 
discredit the proffered testimony, claiming that the hypothetical 
question was incomplete. It was clearly unfair for the master to 
require the presentation of evidence by proffer, and to then 
complain about the evidence thus presented in conformity with the 
masterfs request. 
POINT IV 
ANY REMAND OF THIS CASE SHOULD BE 
TO A DIFFERENT TRIAL JUDGE. 
If any one thing is evident from the record, it is that the 
relationship between the trial court and appellants was strained 
and adversarial. Appellants suggest that any remand of this case 
must, in fairness, be with directions that the case be assigned to 
a different trial judge. 
An award of attorney fees is addressed to the sound discre-
tion of the trial court. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 
985, 988 (Utah 1988). It is difficult to conceive how the trial 
judge can, with impartiality, exercise its discretion without being 
influenced by a desire to vindicate the prior award. 
Even where a formal motion for disqualification has been made 
and denied, the appellate court still has authority to order that 
the remand be made to a different trial judge. United States v. 
Bray, 546 F.2d 851, 860 (10th Cir. 1976). The court in that case 
stated: 
This case has been before the same 
trial judge twice. We do not challenge or 
question the integrity of the judge. 
However, under the totality of the facts 
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and circumstances of this case, there is 
a real likelihood that the same trial 
judgefs impartiality might reasonably be 
at issue under the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 
455(a) which, as revised in 1974, dis-
qualifies any judge from presiding in ". 
any proceeding in which his im-
partiality might reasonably be questioned. " 
We conclude that the demands of justice 
require that the cause be retried before 
another judge. 
See also Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp., 596 F.2d 152, 157 (6th Cir. 
1979) (matter remanded for rehearing before another judge even 
though no party had moved for disqualification or suggested a 
change of judge). 
Canon 3(C)(1) of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct similarly 
requires that M [disqualification must be entered in a proceeding 
by any judge whose impartiality might reasonably be questioned . 
. . ." The trial judge in this case has already twice tried the 
attorney fee issue. Under the totality of the facts and cir-
cumstances of this case, there is a "real likelihood" that the 
trial judge's impartiality would be questioned. In the event this 
case is remanded, therefore, this Court should direct that the case 
be assigned to a different trial judge. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's reduction in attorney fees made in the 
October 31, 1989, Memorandum Decision should be vacated, and the 
initial award made on December 6, 1988, reinstated. 
Alternatively, the case should be remanded for a new hearing 
on the issue of attorney fees and the case should therefore be 
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reassigned to a different judge. This court should direct that on 
remand the appellants be awarded a reasonable attorney fee based 
on a percentage of the recovery, and based on the findings set 
forth in the Memorandum Decision of December 5, 1988. 
DATED this s~ day of May, 1990. 
tf^^f 7i7^</^V^/ 
ACKSON HOWARD and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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APPENDIX A 
Memorandum Decision, datpd December 5, 1988 
<r D 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOLLY PLUMB, SHEILA BOHARD, 
RON C. BOHARD, STEVE RIGBY, 
DEBBIE RIGBY, KENNETH CANDLAND, 
B. CHANG, DAO VAN NGUYEN, 
RANDALL HARDEN, PATTI HARDEN, 
LEE FIET, GARY STRATTON, H. T. 
ADAMS, ALBERT F. PERSCHON, 
RALPH KNUDSON, DEAN HADFIELD, 
ED WICKS, F. E. DRAPER, 
ARTEMUS LITTLE, NAOMA LITTLE, 
ANETTA J. BILGER, O'VERNON 
CAHALL, and all others similarly-
situated, WESTERN HERITAGE 
THRIFT & LOAN, INTERLAKE THRIFT 
& LOAN, COPPER STATE THRIFT & 
LOAN, and CHARTER THRIFT & LOAN, 
Utah Industrial Loan 
Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, GEORGE 
SUTTON, as Commissioner of 
Financial Institutions for the 
State of Utah, THE DEPARTMENT 
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FOR 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ELAINE B. 
WEIS, ALPINE FIRST FINANCIAL, 
ALTA THRIFT AND LOAN, AMERICA 
INVESTMENT THRIFT, AVCO THRIFT, 
BASIN LOANS, INC., CAPITOL 
THRIFT & LOAN, CITICORP PERSON-
TO-PERSON, COMMERCE FINANCIAL, 
COMMERCIAL CREDIT PLAN, INC., 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, FIRST 
THRIFT AND LOAN, GREAT WESTERN 
THRIFT & LOAN, FIRST CHARTER 
SAVINGS BANK (HERITAGE SAVINGS), 
FOOTHILL THRIFT AND LOAN, HOME 
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CREDIT THRIFT & LOAM, MODEL 
FINANCE, INC., OVERLAND THRIFT 
& LOAN, PEOPLE'S FIRST THRIFT, 
PIONEER THRIFT, ST. GEORGE 
THRIFT & LOAN, THE LOCKHART 
COMPANY, U.S. THRIFT & LOAN, 
UNITED THRIFT, UTAH FINANCIAL 
THRIFT, VALLEY THRIFT AND LOAN, 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL, INDUSTRIAL 
LOAN GUARANTY CORPORATION, 
RICHARD A. CHRISTFNSOH. JOHN H. 
FIRMAGE, JR., ROBERT B. 
BECKSTEAD, T. KAY LYMAN, 
RICHARD A. VAN WINKLE, IRENE 
JORGENSEN, STANLEY A. ANDERSON, 
DEAN G. CHRISTEHSEN, ROBERT L. 
LOWE, ED M. JAMISON, RUSSELL B. 
JEX, CHARLES E. JOHNSON, RONALD 
C. LEASE, M.D. BORTHICK, ED H. 
THRONDSEN, RICHARD D. PAUL, 
TERRY WARNER, W. HAROLD DOBSON, 
RICHARD M. ROBINSON, PAUL A. 
MILLER, CARL A. HULBERT, JOHN C. 
JARMAN, FRED S. KOHLRUSS, LARRY 
E. GRANT, LARRY HENDRICKS, 
LARRY H. MILLER, and DOE 1 
through DOE 300, 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter was set for hearing on the 30th 
day of November, 1988 on Motions for Final Court Approval of 
Settlement and Final Court Approval of Attorney's Fees and Costs. 
A representative of Arthur Anderson and Company indicated that 
the ballots had been collated and tabulated as to the depositors' 
responses in approval or disapproval of the settlement. It was 
reported to the Court that only two of approximately 5,000 
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responding depositors determined to opt out of the class, thus 
99.9% of the respondents accepted the settlement as negotiated. 
The Court asked if anyone wished to be heard in opposition 
to the settlement. Attorney Robert McDonald, identifying himself 
as counsel for the Association of Thrift Owners, stated that he 
desired to be heard even though he acknowledged that no formal 
objection had been filed by counsel. Mr. McDonald further 
indicated that he had been retained less than 24 hours earlier to 
proceed. After hearing the argument of Mr. McDonald, the Court 
denied his Motion, both as untimely and factually unfounded. 
The Court further denied Mr. McDonaldfs request for 
additional time to provide the Court with supplemental 
information. 
The Court then considered the issue of final approval of 
attorney's fees and costs, and heard from the following persons: 
Gay Taylor, Legislative General Counsel; Stephen Mecham of the 
Governor's Office; Ray Christensen, counsel for the State; Greg 
Sanders, associated with Carman Kipp, additional counsel for the 
State; Shelia Bohard, with the D.O.I.T. Group, and Gary Stratton, 
Chairman of the Board of the D.O.I.T. Group. 
Finally, the Court heard argument from Malcolm Misuraca, one 
of the attorneys representing the depositor class. At the 
conclusion the Court asked if anyone else wished to be heard on 
PLUMB V. STATE OF UTAH PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
the issues before the Court and received no further requests for 
argument. 
Based upon the pleadings on file and the arguments of 
counsel, the Court makes the following findings in respect to 
settlement and approval of costs and fees: 
The agreement for settlement of the litigation is approved. 
The Court finds the settlement to be appropriate and reasonable 
on behalf of the depositors. Those electing to opt out of the 
settlement are granted their request, and are to participate in 
no further way in the settlement. 
As to the remainder of this decision regarding fees and 
costs, the Court wishes to add parenthetically that the Court 
recognizes no matter what the resolution, someone will be 
dissatisfied. The Court recognizes that to set a fee at less 
than that requested by the plaintiffs1 counsel will be annoying 
and unsatisfactory to counsel. The Court is also aware that 
setting any fee in excess of the legislative cap, or perhaps even 
up to the legislative cap, at $1.5 million will run the risk of 
creating in excess of 17,000 depositor ingrates. Recognizing 
that judges must make unpopular decisions, nevertheless the Court 
feels that the decision herein is appropriate. 
In making a finding as to fees, the Court is mindful first 
of the agreement between the attorneys and the depositor group. 
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The agreement calls for a fee, subject to judicial approval, of 
not less than 20% nor greater than 40% of the recovery. While 
arguably the recovery amount may be $44 million, including $10 
million from the State, $19 million from the insurance carrier, 
and $15 million as a guarantee against liquidation funds, the 
attorneys have requested their fee only in relation to the sum of 
$10 million and $19 million, or from the combined total of $29 
million. 
The Court is further aware of Rule 1.5 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct which indicates that a reasonable fee should 
be determined by consideration of the following matters: (1) the 
time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal 
services properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude 
other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged 
in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount 
involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations 
imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and 
length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the 
experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 
performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or 
contingent. 
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Viewing in order each of the above criteria, the Court 
finds: 
(1) That the attorneys have reasonably spent in excess of 
12,000 hours, and will spend more time before the matter is 
concluded. The novelty and difficulty of the issues involved has 
required tremendous skill in dealing with these problems before 
the legislature and before the court. 
(2) It is obvious that acceptance of this employment 
precluded other opportunities for employment. 
(3) The fees customarily charged for employment such as 
this involve contingent arrangements. This litigation could not 
reasonably have otherwise been entertained, and the amount of 20% 
to 40% of the recovery is appropriate in this and other similar 
communities. 
(4) Considering the amounts involved and the results 
obtained, it is difficult for the Court to find that counsel 
could have expected a much more optimistic result, though the 
depositors individually did. It is easily arguable that the 
maximum amount of liability under any scenario that the State 
should have incurred would have been an amount equal to the 
guarnteed amount of $15,000.00 per account which was the ILGC 
guarantee on such accounts. Thus, anyone whose account exceeded 
$15,000.00 could arguably have never expected a greater recovery. 
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(5) The time limitations imposed by the clients appear to 
be fundamentally irrelevant, except as they may apply to item (2) 
above. 
(6) The nature and length of the relationship does not 
raise issues that are remarkable, except to state that perhaps 
the fact that the matter has been resolved in less than two years 
and without the necessity of trial would argue for a reduction in 
fees. 
(7) The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyers 
is obvious and has been exemplary. 
(8) The contingent relationship has already been referred 
to. 
Having considered each of the foregoing, the Court finds 
that a fee at the minimum of the contingent agreement 
relationship in the amount of 20% of the total recovery is 
reasonable. The attorney's fees are thus awarded in the amount 
of $5,800,000.00. However, the Court finds that many matters 
related to this case have not been concluded by counsel and thus 
the Court will reserve 10% of the fee until counsel have 
faithfully completed all matters in the case. 
The depositors further asked for reimbursement to the 
depositors group in the amount of $300,000.00; and, for a fund 
reserving the amount of $650,000.00 to pay unpaid costs and 
expenses; and an account for future costs and expenses to be 
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reserved in the amount of $1,000,000.00. The Court specifically 
finds as follows: 
1. The fund for future costs and expenses is not to be 
reserved. The amount of $1,000,000.00 requested is denied and 
that amount shall be included in the depositors1 pool for 
distribution. 
2. The reimbursement for depositors in the amount of 
$300,000.00 shall be reserved, subject to release on specific 
application to the Court based upon specific documentation of 
costs and fees and shall only be released upon Court approval. 
3. The unpaid costs and fees proportion shall be reserved, 
subject to a similar accounting to the Court directly. Since 
these matters will require voluminous supportive documentation, 
the Court hereby and herein appoints James U. Jensen, Esq., under 
Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as a Special Master 
for the purpose of reviewing the specific documentation giving 
rise to the requested reimbursement costs. Mr. Jensen is to make 
specific recommendations to the Court as to his findings. No 
fees will be approved for reimbursement of costs or unpaid costs 
and expenses until specifically recommended by the master and 
approved by the Court. 
Mr. Jensen and/or 
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persons in his firm are hereby expressly authorized to have 
access to any and all documentation supporting such costs and 
fees, including the lobbyist's fee requests, and shall be 
provided such material upon request at the offices of D.O.I.T., 
Arthur Anderson, Research Associates and/or any other firm, 
entity or individual requesting compensation as they deem 
necessary. Compensation to Mr. Jensen shall be carefully 
reviewed by the Court and shall be paid from the funds reserved. 
Dated this <S~V>j day of December, 1988, 
/ • s / 
DAVID S . YOl/NG 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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Order, dated December 6, 1988 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOLLY PLUMB, SHEILA BOHARD, 
RON C. BOHARD, STEVE RIGBY, 
DEBBIE RIGBY, KENNETH CANDLAND, 
B. CHANG, DAO VAN NGUYEN, 
RANDALL HARDEN, PATTI HARDEN, 
LEE FIET, GARY STRATTON, H.T. 
ADAMS, ALBERT F. PERSCHON, 
RALPH KNUDSON, DEAN HADFIELD, 
ED WICKS, F. E. DRAPER, 
ARTEMUS LITTLE, NAOMA LITTLE, 
ANETTA J. BILGER, O'VERNON 
CAHALL, and all others similarly 
Situated, WESTERN HERITAGE 
THRIFT & LOAN, INTERLAKE THRIFT 
& LOAN, COPPER STATE THRIFT & 
LOAN, UTAH INDUSTRIAL LOAN 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, GEORGE 
SUTTON, as Commissioner of 
Financial Institutions for the 
State Of Utah, THE DEPARTMENT 
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FOR 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ELAINE B. 
WEIS, ALPINE FIRST FINANCIAL, 
ALTA THRIFT AND LOAN, AMERICA 
INVESTMENT THRIFT, AVCO THRIFT, 
BASIN LOANS, INC., CAPITOL 
THRIFT & LOAN, CITICORP PERSON-
TO-PERSON, COMMERCE FINANCIAL, 
COMMERCIAL CREDIT PLAN, INC., 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, FIRST 
THRIFT AND LOAN, GREAT WESTERN 
THRIFT AND LOAN, FIRST CHARTER 
SAVINGS BANK (HERITAGE SAVINGS), 
rOOTHILL THRIFT AND LOAN, HOME 
;REDIT THRIFT & LOAN, MODEL 
rINANCE, INC., OVERLAND THRIFT 
ORDER 
Civil No. C87-4879 
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& LOAN, PEOPLE'S FIRST THRIFT, 
PIONEER THRIFT, ST. GEORGE 
THRIFT & LOAN, THE LOCKHART 
COMPANY, U.S. THRIFT & LOAN, 
UNITED THRIFT, UTAH FINANCIAL 
THRIFT, VALLEY THRIFT AND LOAN, 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL, INDUSTRIAL 
LOAN GUARANTY CORPORATION, 
RICHARD A. CHRISTENSON, JOHN H. 
FIRMAGE, JR., ROBERT B. 
BECKSTEAD, T. KAY LYMAN, 
RICHARD A. VAN WINKLE, IRENE 
JORGENSEN, STANLEY A. ANDERSON, 
DEAN G. CHRISTENSEN, ROBERT L. 
LOWE, ED M. JAMISON, RUSSELL B. 
JEX, CHARLES E. JOHNSON, RONALD 
C. LEASE, M.D. BORTHICK, ED H. 
THRONDSEN, RICHARD D. PAUL, 
TERRY WARNER, W. HAROLD DOBSON, 
RICHARD M. ROBINSON, PAUL A. 
MILLER, CARL A. HULBERT, JOHN C. 
JARMAN, FRED S. KOHLRUSS, LARRY 
E. GRANT, LARRY HENDRICKS, 
LARRY H. MILLER, and DOE 1 
through DOE 300, 
Defendants. 
Consistent with this Court's Memorandum Decision heretofore 
issued on December 5, 1988, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the Agreement for Settlement of Litigation be 
approved; 
2. That the two depositors requesting that they be allowed to 
opt out of the depositor class be granted their request and thereby-
excluded from the depositor class and the settlement; 
2 
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3. That Malcolm A. Misuraca of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and 
MacRae, formerly of Misuraca, Beyers, Costin, Case and Provencher; 
George M. Haley and Robert L. Stolebarger of Haley & Stolebarger; 
and Douglas B. Provencher of Beyers, Costin and Case, formerly of 
Misuraca, Beyers, Costin, Case & Provencher, be awarded attorneys' 
fees in the amount of $5,800,000.00, 90% or $5,220,000.00 of which 
are to be paid immediately and 10% or $580,000.00 of which are to 
be reserved until counsel has faithfully completed all matters in 
the case. The award of attorneys* fees is intended to reflect 20% 
of the $29,000,000.00 portion of the settlement proceeds. As the 
$29,000,000.00 is reduced to take into account the two depositors 
who opted out of the depositor class, the attorneys1 fees awarded 
herein and the reserve of 10% shall also be reduced proportionately 
to take into account these opt outs; 
4. That James U. Jensen, Esq. be appointed, pursuant to Rule 
53 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as a special master for 
the purpose of reviewing requests for costs reimbursements, and 
that services rendered as special master be compensated from the 
funds hereinafter reserved, as approved by the Court; 
5. That $300,000.00 be reserved for reimbursement to 
Iepositors, subject to release on specific application to the Court 
)ased on specific documentation, as recommended by the special 
master and approved by The Court; 
3 
PLUMB V. STATE OF UTAH PAGE FOUR ORDER 
6» That $650,000.00 be reserved for payment of other costs 
and fees, subject to release on specific application to the Court 
based upon specific documentation, as recommended by the special 
master and approved by the Court. 
7. That Arthur Andersen, a Court appointed Special Master 
under prior order, be paid from the funds reserved under paragraphs 
4 and 5, above. In the event the reserved funds are insufficient to 
cover all claims for expenses authorized to be paid to Special 
Master Arthur Andersen by Special Master James U. Jensen, Esq., 
then Special Master James U. Jensen, Esq. shall request this Court 
to create an adequate reserve from the settlement proceeds to pay 
the expenses of Special Master Arthur Andersen. 
8. That the "Notice of Objection to Disclosure Statement and 
Confirmation of Settlement" filed by an organization calling itself 
the "Association of Thrift Owners and Managers" be denied as 
factually unfounded, in that the factual allegations made therein 
are found to be untrue and not supported by competent evidence, and 
the Motion to Supplement Record made in open Court by Robert 
McDonald, appearing on behalf of said association, be denied as 
untimely. 7\. . ' " 6 , / ^ 
3Y THE COURT 
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Attorney General's Office 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Robert M. McDonald 
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APPENDIX C 
Memorandum Decision, dated October 31, 1989 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOLLY PLUMB, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-87-4879 
The above-entitled matter came on for consideration by the 
Court on the 17th day of July, 1989, with appearances as shown. 
The purpose of the hearing was to review and approve a 
Final Order for payment of all costs and fees from money 
arising through a common fund case. The fund was created by a 
partial settlement of this class action litigation which 
settlement was previously approved by the Court• 
The Court heard the oral arguments of counsel- The Court 
subsequently reviewed in detail that argument through a 
prepared transcript. The Court has reviewed the case law and 
reports submitted by the Special Master, and has reviewed the 
additional documentation submitted by the Special Master, class 
counsel and others. 
The Court now being advised in the premises, renders this 
its: 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Since this decision only relates to the payment of fees and 
costs, a full history of the case is not relevant. However, 
some brief statement of the history of the Orders in relation 
to this aspect of the decision would be instructive. 
On December 5, 1988, this Court entered a Memorandum 
Decision through which the Court appointed James U. Jensen as a 
special master of the Court* The order gave Mr. Jensen the 
charge to review fees and costs, and the charge to make a 
recommendation to the Court as to payment of such fees and 
costs. The Court specifically stated in that order: 
No fees will be approved for reimbursement 
of costs or unpaid costs and expenses until 
specifically recommended by the master and 
approved by the Court* Mr. Jensen is 
charged with the duty both to be fair to 
those requesting payment, and to function as 
a fiduciary for the purpose of preserving 
the maximum estate to the depositor 
group.... (emphasis added) 
In that decision the Court calculated attorney's fees, as 
to the maximum amount to be awarded, based from a pool of $29 
million and the Court reserved a 20% fee, or $5.8 million. The 
Court analyzed the criteria contained in Rule 1.5 of the Rules 
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of Professional Conduct, and compared counsel's performance to 
the standards therein stated. 
At that time the Court did not have a truly adversarial 
situation as to counsel fees, nor did the Court have from 
counsel the input now provided from the Special Master. The 
Court privately expressed to class counsel, Mr. Misuraca, the 
Court's concerns about the information provided by counsel to 
which Mr. Misuraca in his argument took exception, if not 
umbrage. 
The Court would note that in no place did counsel for the 
plaintiffs provide the Court with an adequate analysis of the 
cases and the relevant law wherein judges prior to the 
undersigned have had to make similar decisions as to an 
appropriate basis for an award of attorney's fees. This Court 
was particularly concerned that it was not provided with a 
careful analysis of the information contained in the following 
cases: In re: Wicat Securities Litigation, Civ. No. 83-1117G, 
671 F.Supp. 726 (D. Utah 1987); Pennsylvania, et al v. Delaware 
Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, et al.. No. 85-5, 107 
S.Ct. 3078 (1987); or even of the case of Gamble v. Wells. 450 
So.2d 850 (Fla. 1984), of importance as to the issue of 
legislatively set fees. 
On December 6, 1988, the Court signed an Order prepared by 
the plaintiffs' attorneys which in paragraph 3 authorized 
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$5,220,000,00 be paid immediately to the plaintiffs' 
attorneys. 
Thereafter and prior to any such payment, on December 16, 
the Court entered an Order retaining 33%, or $1,914,000-00 from 
the total amount of $5*8 million. The Court consistently 
advised the Court's Special Master that all fees and costs were 
subject to review due to the fact that the Court felt 
continuing concern about the absence of an adequate adversarial 
process in relation to the review of fees and costs being 
requested. 
Based upon the more recent pleadings filed by the attorneys 
for the plaintiffs and by their own retained counsel, it became 
apparent to this Court that the attorneys were taking the 
position that they did not wish to have the Master review the 
propriety of their fees and costs. On July 5, 1989, this Court 
issued a Minute Entry specifically requesting the Special 
Master lf. . .to inquire into all costs and fees, including the 
attorney's fees and costs as presented to the Court." (Emphasis 
added). The Court further said, "If Mr. Jensen, as to the 
scope of his authority to examine payments or claims from the 
depositors7 funds is to err, he is to err on the side of 
expanded examination of the fees and costs." If not previously 
made clear, it should then have become abundantly clear tc 
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counsel that the Court remained continually concerned about the 
focus on all fees and costs including attorney's fees that were 
being assessed. 
The Court further on July 7, in an additional Minute Entry, 
considering the scope of the hearing set for July 17, stated, 
"Counsel are directed to address themselves to the substance of 
and propriety of the requested fees and costs before the Master 
and before the Court on the now scheduled and pending 
interviews and hearing dates." 
On July 17, 1989, at the time of the hearing, the Court 
inquired of Mr. Misuraca not less than five different times to 
focus his attention and his argument on ff. . . the matters of 
substance. . . M as to why the plaintiffs7 attorneys should be 
entitled to the fees they were then requesting. 
During the whole of that argument Mr. Misuraca never 
adequately addressed the basis or propriety for setting the 
amount of fees and costs to all claimants nor did he address 
whether the Master's recommendations were or were not 
appropriate. His continued challenge was to the Court and the 
Master as to their respective qualifications or judgment. 
The Court through the direct efforts of the Master learned 
that there existed substantial literature and decisional law as 
to fee settings. The cases showed that the Court could look, to 
setting of "reasonable" hourly rates for services rendered. 
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Those rates could be based on local rates charged; attorney's 
experience; examination and review of the type of nours spent 
(including hours that may have been duplicated and/or for 
review of "raw" time hours for their "hard" or "soft" quality); 
and many other factors. 
The Court could further review the magnitude and complexity 
of the litigation; the quality of the representation; the 
nature of the attorneys' and other claimants' agreements as to 
the representation (i.e., contingent or not); the risks assumed 
by the parties and counsel; the reaction of the class to the 
settlement and fees; additionally the Court could look to some 
of the factors of judicial economy in resolving the suit. 
In addition to the substantive factors giving rise to a 
determination of the reasonableness of the fee, the Court notes 
with approval the language in the plurality majority opinion of 
the United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Delaware 
Valley Citizens' Council, cited above, at p. 3 086, wherein the 
Court said it chose ". . .to 'err on the conservative side in 
dealing with any fee question' rather than 'contribute 
unnecessarily to the overpricing of litigation in this or any 
other court.'" 
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As a result of the attitude of plaintiffs' counsel and the 
apparent claim, that they misunderstood the breadth of the 
Court's request of the Master, the Court hereby withdraws all 
prior Orders relating to attorney's fees as having been 
improvidently entered or in the alternative amends the same as 
having been interim orders since there was, at that time, 
insufficient information and analysis to make an appropriate 
final decision. Thus the Court herein makes its final 
decision.1 
In order to avoid further criticism of the Special Master 
and the Court, the Court has conducted its own review and 
Class counsel has criticized the Court and the Special 
Master. However, it is noted that at a minimum, the Special 
Master has brought to the Court's attention that even the 
limited information available to the Court prior to entering 
the previous Orders in this case regarding attorney's fees was 
inaccurate and incomplete. For example, class counsel had 
cited a Third Circuit opinion in support of its assertion that 
a multiplier of 4.0 of the hours expended was common. Not only 
did the Special Master bring to the Court's attention that the 
Third Circuit Court's decision had been reversed by the United 
States Supreme Court, but the Master also pointed out that even 
the Third Circuit opinion itself provided for a multiplier in 
its case of only 2.0, and that was allowed only on a limited 
portion of the hours claimed. The 4.0 claim of the class 
counsel was in error. The Special Master's review of the other 
costs has also assisted this Court. This assistance was 
further confirmed by the recent adoption by the DOIT group of 
the master's recommendation as to future cost accounting and 
record keeping. 
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evaluation of the materials presented, and has drawn its own 
Memorandum Decision and Order. 
Common fund cases such as this case always require the 
Court's determination of the reasonableness of the compensation 
of those who participated in the creation of the fund. When a 
common fund is created by a judgment or settlement of the class 
litigation, the beneficiaries to the fund, when they are 
determined to be members of the "class," are entitled to a 
proportionate share of the fund. Expenses directly benefiting 
the class are first paid from the fund under the direction of 
the Court. Determining a reasonable attorney's fee is an 
obligation of the Court, and is anticipated by class counsel• 
There can be no doubt in this case that class counsel 
anticipated the Court would make such a determination. Class 
counsel's agreement with the class representatives acknowledged 
this, and Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
it. 
It has been said that "success has a thousand fathers, 
while failure is a bastard." Thus, it is not surprising that 
each person with any relationship to the creation of the common 
fund would press upon the Court the singular contribution of 
that person and the merit of the full payment of that person's 
claimed costs or fees. In the instant case, the Court sought 
the services of a Special Master to assist the Court in sorting 
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The Special Master has called to the attention of the Court 
a considerable body of law on the subject. Except for certain 
Utah federal cases, substantially all such law has arisen 
outside the State of Utah, and is found in the published 
opinions of other courts. Relevant and informative studies, 
reports and legal publications have also been cited to the 
Court. Not unexpectedly, much of the law and studies cited by 
others differ from the law and conclusions cited initially by 
class counsel. 
The Court has now reviewed the law cited to the Court, 
including the decision of the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California, entitled In re Activision 
Securities Litigation, Civ. No. C83-4639 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 3, 
1989) which was delivered to the Court by class counsel on 
October 11, 1989; the Court has also reviewed the full record 
in this case. Class counsel and other service providers 
submitted voluminous documentation in support of their 
requests. The Court's Special Master reviewed such 
documentation and discussed the same with the interested 
persons. The Special Master also visited the offices of DOIT, 
and Research Associates, and conducted certain conferences and 
hearings. The Court has reviewed the Master's interim and 
final reports, and has received and reviewed considerable 
supplemental documentation and information, including that 
provided to the Court by class counsel at and before a hearing 
on July 17, 1989. 
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In order to determine a reasonable fee, the Court has 
weighed several factors. Those factors include, but are not 
limited to review of Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court, and other 
factors previously mentioned. The Court has considered the 
Agreement for Settlement of Litigation, the Thrift Settlement 
Financing Act, and the additional matters suggested in the 
Special Master's final report, dated July 14, 1989, and the 
appendix thereto. In particular, on the issue of evaluation of 
skills and competence of counsel, the Court finds based in part 
on the hearing of July 17, 1989, and a review of the record, 
that counsel's court performance does not merit exceptional 
recognition. 
The Court suggests that class counsel's reported hours 
submitted to the Court were higher than reasonable hours, and 
the Court has noted certain discrepancies in such reported 
hours. To the extent a "lodestar" multiplier is applicable to 
this case, the Court finds that the most appropriate and 
commonly used lodestar is far lower than the 4.0 suggested by 
class counsel, and would approach a lodestar factor of 1.5 to 
2.0. This lower lodestar also should be applied to the base of 
efficient hours worked, which the Court finds based on the 
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record and the Court's experience is lower than the hours 
initially submitted by class counsel. A lodestar multiplier of 
2.0 here, applied to all of the hours now submitted by class 
counsel, and at the rate suggested by counsel, would produce an 
attorney's fee of $3.6 million. 
Based upon the information presented to the Court, the 
Court also finds it appropriate to consider the percentage of 
the total common fund to be used for class counsel fees when 
determining a reasonable fee. A study of 206 common fund class 
action cases involving over $2.3 billion in recoveries was 
called to the Court's attention in the appendix to the 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted on behalf of 
Research Associates. The average award for those cases 
computing both fees and costs combined was 13.2%. In this case 
counsel bore little or no risk on costs so on that basis this 
case could justify an even lower percentage applied to fees 
only. 
At the hearing on July 17, 1989, class counsel avoided the 
Court's requests to give the Court substantive information to 
help in determining a reasonable fee, preferring rather to 
employ his time in a rebuke of the Court and an attack on the 
Court's Special Master. The Court rejects the arguments 
advanced by class counsel in such a direction. It is the 
Court's view that Mr. Jensen was well-qualified to accept and 
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discharge the Court's assignment as special master and did so 
with diligence and competence. His strength of character in 
fulfilling this difficult assignment is exemplary. His service 
to the class members has been of considerable value, and he is 
commended by the Court for his manner, methods and thoroughness 
in the discharge of his duties. Since Mr. Jensen's 
qualifications were challenged, the Court notes a brief 
footnote as to some of his achievements.2 
The ultimate determination in this case must be the 
Court's, and the Court must assume responsibility for its 
views. Thus, the Court awards fees as follows: 
1. The Court calculates class counsel fees based on a 
combination of the above reasoning and awards class counsel a 
Mr. Jensen holds J.D. and M.B.A. degrees from Columbia 
University. He served as a law clerk to Judge David T. Lewis, 
Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals and is 
the former General Counsel and Secretary of Dictaphone 
Corporation in Rye, New York. Prior to working for Dictaphone, 
he also served as in-house counsel for Ethyl Corporation and 
Echlin Manufacturing Company. He has employed outside counsel 
in literally hundreds of matters and has reviewed costs and 
fees therein. He has been admitted to practice law in 
Connecticut and Virginia as well as Utah, and is a third 
generation Utah lawyer. In 1985, he served as chief financial 
officer of Cericor, Inc., which, having sold its assets to 
Hewlett-Packard, distributed over thirty million dollars to its 
shareholders. His several written reports in this matter 
exceed 140 ' pages and demonstrate a thorough review of the law 
and facts by a skilled lawyer/master addressing a difficult 
matter. 
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total amount of $4,250,000.00. The Court finds this amount to 
be a reasonable fee in the circumstances.3 
2. The Court awards to each of the service providers as 
follows and adopts the recommendation of the Special Master, 
except where otherwise stated: 
Service Provider Costs Awarded 
Research Associates 4 $ 375,000 
Essig, Dansie & DeKay 107,240 
Edgar, Dunn & Conover 65,810 
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan 21,930 
Economic and Planning Systems 24,990 
DOIT Board 12,350 
MBCCP (Misuraca) 102,690 
Haley & Stolebarger 39,350 
The Court notes that a detailed review of the actual 
hours submitted and an evaluation of their respective weight 
has not been thoroughly pursued because of the Court's belief 
that such an analysis is only one of the many relevant factors 
considered in arriving at the Court's finding of a reasonable 
fee in this case. However, if further evaluation is required 
in the future, this Court reserves for future consideration a 
more detailed study of the time records of class counsel. The 
Court finds that counsel has completed or will shortly have 
completed all matters required of counsel in relation to the 
partial settlement and thus the requirement of a hold back is 
no longer needed. 
The Court has reviewed all matters submitted by this 
service provider and finds that the number of hours recorded 
were excessive. The figure found by the Court applies a 
reduction in hours expended and yet reflects the value added by 
this service provider. 
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3 * All amounts previously paid to counsel and service 
providers are to be deemed an interim payment in advance of the 
final Order as herein established, and are to be credited 
against such total payment. Without waiver of appeal rights 
which remain intact, acceptance of the payments by all service 
providers shall be deemed to be a certification that additional 
remuneration for such services will not be sought by such 
service provider from any member of the class, from class 
counsel, or any third person. Final payments by the special 
master Arthur Andersen shall so provide by restrictive 
endorsement. 
4. The Court further finds that since there have been 
substantial delays in ultimately paying all fees and costs as 
herein ordered, that the counsel and service providers are 
entitled to an additional administrative cost .akin to 
interest. The administrative cost is to be calculated on the 
basis of first determining the amount due and owing and unpaid 
to counsel or the service provider, and second, adding an 
amount generally equivalent to the average amount earned on the 
invested common fund calculated from December 22, 1988 until 
payments in full are made. This determination is to be made by 
the Court's Special Master, Arthur Andersen. 
5. Consistent herewith, the Court requests that its 
master Arthur Andersen promptly prepare checks and make 
PLUMB V. STATE PAGE FIFTEEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
distribution of the remaining amounts due to class counsel and 
the service providers for all services rendered through 
December 1, 1988. 
6. Special Master James U. Jensen is instructed to 
deliver a copy hereofto the interested parties and persons. 
Dated this w / dav of October,^1239. 
DAVID S. YOUN; 
DISTRICT CO 
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Memoranduia Decision, to the following, 
this 31 dav of October, 1989: 
James U. Jensen 
Special Master 
19 W. South Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
APPENDIX D 
Agreed Statement in Lieu of Record on Appeal 
JACKSON HOWARD (1548), 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752) and 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
S:haley-st.nn 
Our File No. 19,397 
Attorneys for Class Counsel 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOLLY PLUMB, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, et al., 
Defendants. 
AGREED STATEMENT IN LIEU 
OF RECORD ON APPEAL 
MALCOLM A. MISURACA, HALEY & 
STOLEBARGER, DOUGLAS B. PROVENCHER, 
and BEYERS, COSTIN & CASE, 
Appellants. 
Case No. 900012 
Appellants, Malcolm A. Misuraca, Haley & Stolebarger, Douglas B. Provencher, and 
Buyers, Costin & Case (hereafter "Class Counsel"), by and through their attorney Jackson 
Howard, and respondents, the plaintiff depositor class (hereinafter "Appellees"), by and 
through their counsel on appeal, Craig G. Adamson and Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., stipulate and 
agree to the following statement in lieu of a record on appeal. The parties further agree, 
however, that the entire text of any document referred to herein shall be deemed a part of 
the record on appeal. 
1. The Appellees in this action are the representative plaintiffs and the depositor 
class consisting of approximately seven thousand households holding approximately seventeen 
thousand accounts in five failed thrift institutions in the State of Utah. The Appellees seek 
recovery of their lost deposit accounts. The Appellees have not had access to the funds in 
their accounts since July 31, 1986. 
2. Subsequent to the failure of the thrift institutions, Appellees, through their 
representatives, employed Class Counsel to represent them. This occurred after an extensive 
search and interview involving a number of prospective attorneys. After negotiations between 
Class Counsel's and Appellees' representatives, a written attorney fee agreement was reached 
between Class Counsel and Appellees. The written attorney fee agreement provided, among 
other things, that Class Counsel would be awarded a reasonable attorney fee to be determined 
by the trial court and that the parties agreed that a reasonable fee would be between twenty 
and forty percent of the recovery. 
3. Thereafter, one hundred percent of the class members responding (approxi-
mately eighty percent of the class polled) expressly consented to the employment of clas* 
counsel. 
4. Class Counsel filed this action on behalf of Appellees on July 20, 1987. 
5. On October 24, 1988, Appellees filed their Motion for Certification of Cla< 
Action which sought an order certifying the class for settlement purposes only. The motio 
was stipulated to the principal defendants and was granted by orders entered October 31, 198 
and November 2, 1988. 
6. In connection with their representation of Appellees, Class Counsel worked ar 
negotiated with the legislature of the State of Utah, which initially resulted in tl 
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appointment of a task force to study the claims against the State, and ultimately, after 
numerous appearances by Class Counsel before the task force, the trial court, and after many 
months of intense negotiations, resulted in a settlement of this case between the class, the State 
of Utah, California Union Insurance Company (the State's insurer), and certain other parties 
including the Trustees Loan Guarantee Corporation and thrift and loan institutions that 
became federally insured. 
7. Legislation implementing the settlement was signed by Governor Norman 
Bangerter on October 11, 1988, and is codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-21-1 to -10 (Supp. 
1989). 
8. The settlement contained essentially the following terms and features: 
a. The State of Utah paid $10 million outright to the depositors from 
the general fund. 
b. The State's insurance carrier, California Union Insurance Company 
(MCal Union"), paid an additional $19 million cash to the settlement. 
c. The State advanced to the depositors an additional $15 million from 
the general fund in exchange for a share in future receipts from the liquidation of the assets 
of the five failed thrifts and the Industrial Loan Guarantee Corporation. 
d. The parties agreed that up to $1 million from the settlement could 
be set aside by the trial court to create a sinking fund for expenses of the future class action 
litigation. 
e. The State and California Union agreed to pool their claims against 
other defendants with those of Appellees agreeing to share the first $5 million recovered, one-
half to the appellees and one-half to the state with recoveries over $5 million being distributed 
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one-third to the Appellees, one-third to the State, and one-third to the insurance carriers, after 
deducting costs of litigation other than attorney fees. Utah Code Ann. § 7-21-4 (Supp. 1989); 
Motion for Preliminary and Final Approval of the Partial Settlement of Class Action; 
Preliminary and Final Approval of Attorneys' Fees and Costs; Preliminary and Final Approval 
of Amounts to Reimburse Depositors and Set-Aside Funds for Future Litigation, Costs and 
Expenses (hereinafter "Motion for Preliminary Approval"), filed October 25, 1988. 
9. At a hearing held October 31, 1988, the trial court granted a Motion for 
Preliminary Approval and approved a form of ballot. Formal orders approving the form of 
ballot and exclusion (opt out) forms, and the form of published notice to the class, were 
entered on October 31, 1988 and November 2, 1988. 
10. Documents outlining the proposed settlement were thereafter mailed to all 
known depositors and published in various newspapers. Included in the materials thus mailed 
and published was a notice that Class Counsel intended to request an attorney fee of $7.25 
million (calculated as 25% of the $10 million portion of the recovery paid from the State 
general fund plus the $19 million portion paid by the State's insurers). 
11. The class overwhelmingly voted to accept the settlement, which had beer 
submitted to the class together with notice that Class Counsel was requesting a fee of $7.2' 
million; 99.99% of the vote on the settlement was in favor of its acceptance. 
12. Only five depositors filed objections to the requested attorney fees, consistin 
of a letter filed November 10, 1988, a Notice of Objection to Confirmation of Disclosur 
Statement and Settlement filed November 21, 1988, a letter filed November 21, 1988, and tw 
additional objections to attorneys' fees filed November 23, 1988. 
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13. A hearing on the proposed settlement and request for attorney fees was held 
November 30, 1988. In connection with that hearing, Class Counsel submitted a Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Attorneys' Fees for Class Counsel. That memorandum discussed 
the contingent fee contract, the Lodestar approach, the percentage of fund approach, and the 
appropriate factors to be considered in determining fees. The memorandum included nearly 
two hundred pages of addendum detailing time expended by counsel on the case. Class 
Counsel also submitted an affidavit of Senator Fred W. Finlinson, sponsor of the bill that 
produced the settlement, who supported the fee request of Class Counsel. A separate affidavit 
was submitted by Carman Kipp, counsel to the State of U'ah, in which Mr. Kipp stated that 
the fee request of $7.25 million was not unreasonable. Ray R. Christiansen, co-counsel to State 
of Utah stated his opinion that a fair fee would be in the range of 3.5 to 5 million dollars. 
Counsel for the legislature Ms. Gaye Taylor argued in favor of a fee of 1.5 million. Malcom 
A. Misuraca speaking for class counsel addressed the court in rebuttal and answered the 
questions posed by the court. Mr. Gary Stratton, President of the depositors organization 
(D.O.I.T.) reiterated that it was the depositors collective view that a fair fee would be 20% to 
40% of the $29,000,000.00 portion of the recovery. Many other depositors were present but no 
other depositor addressed the court. The trial court took the matters under advisement 
following the hearing. 
14. On December 5, 1988, the trial court issued its memorandum decision, and on 
December 6, 1988, an order, which, among other things, approved the settlement, awarded Class 
Counsel attorney fees of $5.8 million (20% of the $29 million portion of the recovery), and 
appointed a special master, James U. Jensen "for the purpose of reviewing request for cost 
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reimbursements . . . ." retaining those costs reimbursement requests made by expert witnesses, 
lobbyists, and others under advisement. 
15. On December 16, 1988, the special master submitted his First Interim Report, 
which was adopted by the trial court, without notice or hearing, by order entered the same 
day. The December 16 order modified the trial court's December 6 order by withholding 33% 
of the attorney fee award and concluding that a substantial portion of the costs and expenses 
of litigation should be borne by Class Counsel. 
16. The special master's Second Interim Report, relating to the special master 
Arthur Anderson & Company, was submitted in February, 1989. 
17. The Third Interim Report and Recommendation to Judge David S. Young by 
Special Master, James U. Jensen ("Third Report") was submitted on May 2, 1989. The Third 
Report recommended reduced cost reimbursements to all providers with the exception of 
D.O.I.T. (a private corporation representing the depositors) and one private provider, whos< 
requests were recommended to be reimbursed in full. The Third Report also recommendec 
that the trial court's attorney fee award of $5.8 million be reduced by one-third (approxi 
mately $1.9 million) to approximately $3.9 million. 
18. Prior to issuing the Third Report, Special Master Jensen held no hearings, an 
took no evidence on the record. Special Master Jensen acknowledged in the Third Report an 
in subsequent proceedings that his "investigation" and fact finding functions were conducte 
entirely off the record and without notice to any parties. 
19. On February 14, 1989, the trial court entered an "Order of Dismissal ar 
Order With Respect to Amended Pleading which dismissed all pending claims again 
defendants subject to leave to file an amended complaint. 
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20. On March 2, 1989, plaintiffs filed a Motion to Create Reserve for Litigation 
Expenses, which was granted by order entered June 8, 1989. 
21. On May 15, 1989, Jackson Howard, for Howard, Lewis & Petersen, entered an 
appearance for Class Counsel with respect to the fee dispute, and filed a Motion to Fix Time 
for Objection or Other Response to Master's Third Interim Report and Recommendation 
together with a supporting memorandum. The-motion sought, among other things, an order 
setting a schedule and deadline for conducting discovery with respect to the Third Report. 
22. On June 12, 1989, the trial court entered a minute entry denying Class 
Counsel's request to fix a schedule for discovery and to respond to the Third Report, and 
directing that no discovery be permitted. The minute entry further set a hearing for July 17, 
1989, for review of the Third Report, and provided that all additional information relative 
to the Third Report must first be submitted to Special Master Jensen and that Special Master 
Jensen would schedule the presentation before the trial court. 
23. On June 14, 1989, Special Master Jensen sent a letter to Class Counsel and 
other interested persons enclosing the minute entry by Judge Young dated June 12, 1989, and 
giving directions for requesting time on the hearing scheduled for July 17, 1989. 
24. On June 15, 1989, Class Counsel filed their "Motion to Strike Reports of 
Special Master and for Other Relief, together with a supporting memorandum. 
25. On July 3, 1989, Class Counsel filed a Motion for Stay, together with a 
supporting memorandum, which sought an order staying all proceedings before the Special 
Master until the challenges to his jurisdiction, authority, methods and "findings" could be 
resolved. Class Counsel also filed a Request for Oral Argument in connection with the motion. 
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26. On July 5, 1989, the trial court sua sponte entered three minute entries. The 
first purported to "clarify1* the direction and authority of Special Master Jensen. The second 
minute entry denied Class Counsel's challenges to the appointment and authority of the special 
master. The third minute entry denied motions by Craig Adamson, attorney for the depositors, 
challenging the special master's reports. 
27. On July 8, 1989, and at the request of Class Counsel, a "hearing" was held 
before Special Master Jensen. Class Counsel had requested approximately two days-to present 
the necessary evidence on Class Counsel's request for attorney fees. Special Master Jensen 
responded that only two hours would be permitted, but that testimony could be submitted by 
proffer. At the July 8 hearing, Class Counsel proffered evidence from several expert 
witnesses, each of whom was competent to testify and was knowledgeable concerning class 
action litigation and contingent fee litigation, and each of whom would have testified that the 
$5.8 million fee requested by Class Counsel was less than a reasonable fee, or was the 
minimum fee which would be reasonable. 
28. The hypothetical questions submitted to the expert witnesses accurately se 
forth the relevant facts. 
29. On July 13, 1989, Jackson Howard filed a motion for continuance of th 
scheduled hearing before Judge Young on July 13, asserting that Mr. Howard was the 
involved in a previously scheduled jury trial in Federal Court which was running longer tha 
expected and which would continue through July 17. Mr. Howard had advised Judge Your 
of the conflict several days previously, but at the suggestion of the court the date remain< 
unchanged pending developments within the federal case which might obviate the need f 
changing the hearing date. 
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30. The trial court denied the motion for a continuance and instead engaged in 
a telephone conversation with Judge David Sam of the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah wherein Judge Sam agreed to allow Mr. Howard to leave the jury trial in 
Judge Sam's court for the purpose of attending Judge Young's hearing. Judge Sam indicated 
that he would not allow Mr. Howard to leave until 11:00, which meant that he would not be 
able to arrive at Judge Young's court until approximately 11:30, but Judge Young refused to 
alter the starting time of the hearing from the scheduled 10:00 a.m. 
31. On July 14, 1989, Special Master Jensen filed his Final Report on Costs and 
Fees of Class Counsel and Service Providers to Judge David S. Young by Special Master James 
U. Jensen (hereinafter "Final Report"). The Final Report, in essence, withdrew the 
recommendations made in the Third Report, and instead "advised" the court as to the factors 
which could properly be considered in fixing a reasonable attorney fee. The report did not 
make any findings concerning the matters which had been proffered to the special master at 
the hearing on July 8, nor make any findings on any other issues. 
32. On July 17, 1989, Judge David S. Young held a hearing in his courtroom 
commencing at 10:00 a.m. Craig S. Adamson presented arguments on behalf of the depositors, 
and stated that is was the position of the D.O.I.T. Board and the representative plaintiffs that 
the December 5 and 6 award of attorney fees should not be reopened and reexamined. Mr. 
Adamson further objected to the proceedings before the Master on the basis that the Master 
had not provided for the taking of evidence on the record with an opportunity to the parties 
to cross examine. 
9 
33. Judge Young stated at the July 17th hearing that he had received numerous 
letters from depositors which were not part of the record and which he would not disclose to 
counsel. 
34. Mr. Misuraca presented arguments at the July 17th hearing relating to the 
qualifications, appointment and methods of the Master. 
35. Mr. Howard, attorney for Class Counsel, was not present at the beginning of 
the July 17th hearing, and was not able to attend until after the hearing was more than half 
way through, and therefore, heard only the last of Mr. Misuraca's argument. Further, it was 
not intended by Mr. Howard that Mr. Misuraca argue the case, but because Mr. Howard had 
not arrived when his portion of the argument occurred, Mr. Misuraca attempted to fill in until 
Mr. Howard arrived. As a result, and because of extendea exchange between Mr. Misuraca and 
the court Mr. Howard had approximately 15 minutes to address the issues before the courts 
pre-announced recess time of 12 noon. 
36. Mr. Malcolm A. Misuraca also presented arguments, and proffered evidence 
that Carman Kipp, if called to testify, would testify that the initial award of S5.8 million was 
a reasonable award. 
37. Judge Young took the matter under advisement following the hearing. 
38. Following the hearing, Judge Young ordered a transcript of the argumen 
presented at the July 17th hearing by Mr. Misuraca, but ordered no other portions. Th 
portion of the transcript ordered by Judge Young was filed on August 22, 1989. 
39. On October 31, 1989, Judge Young entered his Memorandum Decision froi 
which this appeal is taken. 
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40. Copy of the Memorandum Decision were mailed to all parties by the Special 
Master, and a Certificate of Service was filed on November 6, 1989. 
41. On November 21, 1989, Class Counsel and the Plaintiff Class filed a Motion 
to Disqualify Judge Young, which motion was heard by Judge Daniels on December 27, 1989, 
and denied by Order entered on January 16, 1990. 
42. A transcript of the remaining portions of the July 17th hearing was prepared 
at the request of plaintiffs and filed with the Court. 
43. A transcript of the hearing held before the Special Master on July 8, 1989, was 
transcribed and may be considered as part of the record on appeal. 
DATED this &*~ day of May, 1990. 
'ACKSON HOWARD, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Class Counsel 
DATED this day of May, 1990. 
STEWART M. HANSON, JR. 
DATED this day of May, 1990. 
CRAIG W. ADAMSON 
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APPENDIX E 
Utah R. Civ. P. 53. 
Rule 53- Masters. 
(a) Appointment and compensation. Any or all of the issues in an action 
may be referred by the court to a master upon the written consent of the 
parties, or the court may appoint a master in an action, in accordance with the 
provisions of Subdivision (b) of this rule. As used in these rules the word 
"master" includes a referee, an auditor, and an examiner. The compensation 
to be allowed to a master shall be fixed by the court, and shall be charged 
upon such of the parties or paid out of any fund or subject matter of the action, 
which is in the custody and control of the court as the court may direct. The 
master shall not retain his report as security for his compensation; but when 
the party ordered to pay the compensation allowed by the court does not pay it 
after notice and within the time prescribed by the court, the master is entitled 
to a writ of execution against the delinquent party. 
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the 
rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the 
issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of 
account, a reference shall, in the absence of the written consent of the parties, 
be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it. 
(c) Powers. The order of reference to the master may specify or limit his 
powers and may direct him to report only upon particular issues or to do or 
perform particular acts or to receive and report evidence only and may fix the 
time and place for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing of the 
master's report. Subject to the specifications and limitations stated in the 
order, the master has and shall exercise the power to regulate all proceedings 
in every hearing before him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary 
or proper for the efficient performance of his duties under the order. He may 
require the production before him of evidence upon all matters embraced in 
the reference, including the production of all books, papers, vouchers, docu-
ments, and writings applicable thereto. He may rule upon the admissibility of 
evidence unless otherwise directed by the order of reference and has the au-
thority to put witnesses on oath and may himself examine them and may call 
the parties to the action and examine them upon oath. When a party so 
requests, the master shall make a record of the evidence offered and excluded 
in the same manner and subject to the same limitations as provided in the 
Utah Rules of Evidence for a court sitting without a jury. 
(d) Proceedings. 
(1) Meetings. When a reference is made, the clerk shall forthwith fur-
nish the master with a copy of the order of reference. Upon receipt thereof 
unless the order of reference otherwise provides, the master shall forth-
with set a time and place for the first meeting of the parties or their 
attorneys to be held within 20 days after the date of the order of reference 
and shall notify the parties or their attorneys. It is the duty of the master 
to proceed with all reasonable diligence. Either party, on notice to the 
parties and master, may apply to the court for an order requiring the 
master to speed the proceedings and to make his report. If a party fails to 
appear at the time and place appointed, the master may proceed ex parte 
or, in his discretion, adjourn the proceedings to a future day, giving notice 
to the absent party of the adjournment. 
(2) Witnesses. The parties may procure the attendance of witnesses 
before the master by the issuance and service of subpoenas as provided in 
Rule 45. If without adequate excuse a witness fails to appear or give 
evidence, he may be punished as for a contempt and be subjected to the 
consequences, penalties, and remedies provided in Rules 37 and 45. 
(3) Statement of accounts. When matters of accounting are in issue 
before the master, he may prescribe the form in which the accounts shall 
be submitted and in any proper case may require or receive in evidence a 
statement by a certified public accountant who is called as a witness. 
Upon objection of a party to any of the items thus submitted or upon a 
showing that the form of statement is insufficient, the master may re-
quire a different form of statement to be furnished, or the accounts or 
specific items thereof to be proved by oral examination of the accounting 
parties or upon written interrogatories or in such other manner as he 
directs. 
fe) Report. 
(1) Contents and filing. The master shall prepare a report upon the 
matters submitted to him by the order of reference and* if required to 
make findings of fact and conclusions of law, he shall set them forth in the 
report. He shall file the report with the clerk of the court and in an action 
to be tried without a jury, unless otherwise directed by the order of refer-
ence, shall file with it a transcript of the proceedings and of the evidence 
and the original exhibits. The clerk shall forthwith mail to all parties 
notice of the filing. 
(2) In non-jury actions. In an action to be tried without a jury the 
court shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. 
Within 10 days after being served with notice of the filing of the report 
any party may serve written objections thereto upon the other parties. 
Application to the court for action upon the report and upon objections 
thereto shall be by motion and upon notice as prescribed in Rule 6(d). The 
court after hearing may adopt the report or may modify it or may reject it 
in whole or in part or may receive further evidence or may recommit it 
with instructions. 
(3) In jury actions. In an action to be tried by a jury the master shall 
not be directed to report the evidence. His findings upon the issues sub-
mitted to him are admissible as evidence of the matters found and may be 
read to the jury, subject to the ruling of the court upon any objections in 
point of law which may be made to the report. 
(4) Stipulation as to findings. The effect of a master's report is the 
same whether or not the parties have consented to the reference; but, 
when the parties stipulate that a master's findings of fact shall be final, 
only questions of law arising upon the report shall thereafter be consid-
ered. 
(5) Draft report Before filing his report a master may submit a draft 
thereof to counsel for all parties for the purpose of receiving their sugges-
tions. 
(f) Objections to appointment of master. A party may object to the ap-
pointment of any person as a master on the same groimds as a party may 
challenge for cause any prospective trial juror in the trial of a civil action. 
Such objections must be heard and disposed of by the court in the same man-
ner as a motion. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
